THE

TEACHINGS OF VEDĀNTA

ACCORDING TO

RĀMĀNUJA.

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

ZUR

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GENEHMIGT

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VASUDEV ANANT SUKHTANKAR

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TO

MY RESPECTED TEACHER

GEHEIMER REGIERUNGSRAT

PROF. DR. HERMANN JACOBI

V.A.S.
Biographical sketch.

I, Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, was born at Islampur, District Satara, India on the 22nd June 1877. My father, Anant Abaji Sukhtankar, was a Sāraswata Brāhman. My religion is Brahmaism. I visited the Private English School and the Mission High School at Kolhapur and passed in 1896 the Matriculation examination of the Bombay University. Then I joined the Rajaram College, and passed in 1897 the Previous and in 1898 the Intermediate examination for the degree of B.A. In 1899 and 1900 I was a student of the B.A. Class at the Fergusson College. Then for three years I was a teacher at the Parsee Girls’ High School at Poona, and in the October of 1903 I went to Oxford, where I studied Philosophy and Comparative Religion at the Manchester College for two years. Then with the generous help of the Hibbert Trustees I was enabled to proceed to Germany for further study. During the Winter-Semester 1905/06 I studied at the University of Kiel and for four Semesters more I was a student at the University of Bonn, where I studied Sanskrit, Philosophy, and Economies. I passed my Ph.D. examination on the 29th of January 1908. I heartily thank all my teachers at this place; to Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Benno Erdmann and to Geheimrat Prof. D. Hermann Jacobi I feel particularly indebted for the generous help, which they always readily granted to me in my work.
Preface.

Sir Monier Williams in his 'Hinduism' (p. 140) writes: —

Ramanuja was born at Sri Parambattura (about 26 miles west of Madras), and is known to have studied at Conjeveram and to have resided at Sri Rangam, near Trichinopoly. He probably flourished about the middle or latter part of the 12th century.

Pandita Rama Misra Sastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, the learned editor of Ramanuja's works, says in the Introduction to his edition of Vedârthasamgraha that Ramanuja was a Dravida Brâhmaṇa of the family Harita; his father's name was Kesava and his mother's, Kantimati. The Guru of Ramanuja was his maternal uncle, Sailapurna, who is said to have been a great scholar of Ramaïyaṇa. But for his philosophical knowledge and for his way of interpreting the teachings of the Upanîṣads, Ramanuja is indebted to the Guru of his Guru (paramaguru, Ved. Samg. p. 144), Yamunâcārya. Ramanuja begins his Vedârthasamgraha as well as his commentary on the Bhagavad-Gītā by paying his tribute of respect to Yamuna. A work of the latter, Siddhitraya, has been edited.

1 The Pandita has also published a separate book, called Ācâryaparicāryā giving all the traditional information concerning Ramanuja and his sect.

2 I.e. 'Three Demonstrations'. The work is divided into three chapters, the first dealing with the nature of the souls (atma-siddhi), the second with the problem of God's existence (īśvara-siddhi) and the third with the nature of consciousness (samvit-siddhi).
by Rama Misra Sastrin in the Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series (no. 36, Benares 1900), which shows that Yamuna was a man of great originality and of real philosophical insight. Not only do we meet in Ramanuja’s works with a few quotations from Siddhitraya, but we see that Ramanuja generally follows the same lines of argument as we find in Yamuna’s work.

According to Rama Misra Gastrin (loc. cit.) Ramanuja wrote the following works: — 1) Vedārthaśaṁgraha, 2) Śrībhāṣya, 3) Gitābhāṣya, 4) Vedāntasāra, 5) Vedāntadiṇa, 6) Nityārādhana-vidhi, 7) (a) Śrīgadyam, (b) Saranāgatigadyam and (c) Brhadgadyam, which three together make the prose work generally known by the name of Gadyatrayam.

The last two of these I have not been able to see; but to judge from their titles they are very probably works of more popular nature and have not much to do with Ramanuja’s philosophical teachings. Of the rest the first three are undoubtedly by Ramanuja. The phraseology, modes of expression as well as complete agreement in views, leave no room for doubt. These works were written in the order given above; in Śrībhāṣya Ramanuja refers to Vedārthaśaṁgraha by name (p. ix 263 & p. x 267) and in Gitābhāṣya we see several traces\(^1\) which show that it was written after Śrībhāṣya. The following Dissertation is based on these three works.

Vedārthaśaṁgraha is a short and independent work, of polemical nature, in which Ramanuja tries to establish his way of interpreting the main teachings of the Upaniṣads against those of other schools of Vedānta, especially against that of the illusionists\(^\text{Māyāvādins}^\)\. This work, along with the commentary on it by Sudarśana Sūri, is edited in the Paṇḍīt (vol. XV—XVI). Śrībhāṣya, the principal work of Ramanuja, is a commentary on the Śāṅkara Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. This voluminous work (along with the commentary, Śruti prakāśikā, also by Sudarśana Sūri) was being pu-

\(^1\) The commentary on Gitā xiii. 2 contains a long quotation from Śrībhāṣya (p. x 302 f.). Cf. also Gitābhāṣya viii. 23—27 with Śrībhāṣya Śū. iv. 2. 20.
blished for eleven years in the Panḍit (vol. VII ff.). The following remarks of Dr. Thibaut concerning Śrībhāṣya do not contain the least amount of exaggeration: — The intrinsic value of the Śrībhāṣya is — as every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge — a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of Śaṅkara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere out-come of Rāmānuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition. (Introduction to his translation of the Vedānta Sūtras. S. B. E. vol. XXXIV, p. xvii.) The Śrībhāṣya has been translated by Dr. Thibaut in the S. B. E. vol. XLVIII. Gitābhāṣya is a running and lucid commentary on the Bhagavad-Gītā. (Published in Bombay at the Lakṣmīnivesākateśvara' Press. Śaka 1815. 1893 A.D.)

Of the remaining two works, Vedāntasāra and Vedāntadīpa, which are attributed to Rāmānuja in the above list, I have not been able to see the former. Rev. J. J. Johnson in his edition of Vedāntatattvasāra (p. v) says that he was enabled to look over a copy of that work and that it was a very brief gloss on the Brahma Sūtras. But according to Thibaut (loc. cit. p. xvi) it is a systematic exposition of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sūtras. Rev. Johnson does not believe that the work is by Rāmānuja himself. Vedāntadīpa is published in the Benares Sanskrit Series (nros. 69—71). The language of this book is so different from that of the three works which undoubtedly are Rāmānuja’s, that I

1 From the fourteenth volume of the Panḍit the works edited in it, can be bound and paged separately. Hence in the following Dissertation I have referred just to the pages of Vedārthasaṅgraha and of the latter portion of Śrībhāṣya. But in referring to the first portion of Śrībhāṣya I have added the number of the volume in Roman figures. In the references where no mention of the work is made, Śrībhāṣya is to be understood.

2 I found the translation of great help in my study of Rāmānuja and I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the learned translator.
cannot believe that the work belongs to the same author. But it is a very clear and trustworthy abridgment of the Śrībhāṣya, made, as a rule, in the very words of the latter work.

Another work which is not included in the above list, but which is usually attributed to Rāmānuja is Vedāntatatattvasāra. It is published with English translation and notes by Rev. J. J. Johnson in the Panḍit. (Reprint, 2nd edition, Benares 1899.) Rev. Johnson, for reasons which he has stated in the preface, came to the conclusion that the work was not by Rāmānuja himself, but by some follower of his. And now we learn from Rāma Miśra Šāstrin (loc. cit.) that the author of this work is Sudarṣana Śūri, the learned commentator of Rāmānuja’s works. The work has been rightly described by Rev. Johnson as consisting of a series of refutations of the leading Śāṅkara doctrines and vindications of those of Rāmānuja. It is full of quotations from Rāmānuja’s works and gives a true idea of the important teachings of Rāmānuja.

In the beginning of Vedārthasamgraha Rāmānuja alludes to Yamuna as having dispelled the delusion, which was caused by the false interpreters of Vedānta doctrines. And in the opening verses of the Śrībhāṣya he says that he wants to teach the saving truths of the Upaniṣads, which Pārāśarya (i.e.Vyāsa, who according to the tradition is identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Sūtras) had put together and which the ‘teachers of old’ had safely handed down, but which have become, owing to conflicting interpretations, hard to grasp. The turning-point of the various interpretations of the Vedānta teachings lies in the construction to be put upon the relation of oneness, which the Upaniṣads teach to exist, between Brahman on the one hand and the world of matter and souls on the other. In his works Rāmānuja argues against three classes of ‘deluded followers of Vedānta’ (Vedā’valambi-kudṛṣṭi, Ved.Samg. p.149). The most prominent among these are the ‘Illusionists’ (Māyāvādins), who cut the Gordian Knot by simply denying reality to the world.

1 Of course Rāmānuja too believes that the author of the Sūtras is also the author of the Mahābhārata. (p. 481f.)
According to them not only the world of matter, including our bodies and sense-organs, not only our consciousness of pain and limitations, but even the consciousness of individuality is an illusion, the only reality being Brahman, which is undifferentiated, objectless, pure 'consciousness'.

The other two 'false' interpreters of Vedānta have great agreement between themselves. They differ from the 'Illusionists' in admitting that Brahman possesses all good qualities and is not an 'undifferentiated mass of pure consciousness'. Further they admit that the world of matter has a real existence, though essentially it is the same as Brahman. The contact of the material bodies with Brahman acts upon the latter as 'limiting adjuncts' (Upādhis) and thus we get the individual souls. But in the interpretation of this point in their theory, the two schools differ. According to one view (which the commentator attributes to Bhāskara) the Brahman actually undergoes all the sufferings and transmigrations of the individual souls under the influence of the Upādhis. The second view (which is known as the view of 'simultaneous difference and non-difference' [bhedābheda] and which the commentator attributes to Yādavapra-kāśa) fights shy of such a revolting admission and says that though the Brahman undergoes the limitations of individual souls, it also remains at the same time in its pristine exalted condition. It finds no contradiction in saying that a thing can be different and at the same time non-different from itself. On the contrary it says that all things always present themselves to us under these two aspects. They present 'non-difference' as far as their (causal) substance (kāraṇa) and class-characteristics (jāti) are concerned; and they present difference, as far as their (effected) conditions (kārya) and individual characteristics (vyakti) are concerned. But according to this view, whereas Brahman and matter are essentially (svābhāvika) non-different and also essentially different; Brahman and individual souls are essentially non-different but only accidentally (auṇādhika) different. (Ved. Samg. pp. 14—15; Śribhāṣya p. x 256, x 479 ff.)
Rāmānuja thinks that none of these views is in harmony with the true teachings of the Upaniṣads and that they are besides involved in many logical difficulties. Against all of them he maintains that not only the world of matter, but even the individual souls have a real existence of their own and that neither of them are essentially the same as Brahman. Hence unconsciousness belongs only to matter, and ignorance and suffering only to the individual souls, and Brahman is eternally free from all imperfections. But still Brahman and the entire world form a unity; because both matter and individual souls have existence only as the 'body' of Brahman, i.e., they can exist and be what they are and can act, only because Brahman is their Soul (ātman) and the inwardly controlling Power (antaryāmin). Apart from Brahman they are nothing.

As said above Rāmānuja claims that his teaching is in conformity with that of the 'teachers of old' (pūrvācaryas) and that other schools had introduced unjustifiable innovations. How far is he justified in making this claim? The two schools of Bhāskara and Yādava never rose to any great importance and are now practically unknown in India and therefore we can leave them out of consideration. Hence the question reduces itself to, whether the 'Illusionists' or Rāmānuja represents the older view of Vedānta more faithfully. Unfortunately the works of older expounders of Vedānta are not extant. Rāmānuja quotes a few passages dealing with some of the important points of the system from the writings of ancient teachers, which show that he was in the main following the tradition. I shall give here a few illustrations. 1) The passages quoted from the Vākyakāra in Śrībhāṣya (pp. vii 627 & 634 ff.) show that Rāmānuja is closely following him in the conception\(^1\) of the nature of 'knowledge' that leads to final release and of its pre-requisites. 2) On p. ix 601, of Śrībhāṣya we have quotations from the Vṛtti and from the Drahamābhāṣya, which show that their authors believed in the continued individual existence of the released (āsarīra)

\(^1\) That this conception presupposes that the 'bondage' is not merely an illusion (māyā), will be shown below. (See p. 159 ff.)
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

souls and that according to them the powers possessed by the released souls were the same as taught by Rāmānuja. 3) The Vākyakāra says, 'Brahman is to be understood as the Soul of all' (p. x 267); the Vṛtti kāra says, 'Brahman is the Soul of all, the Ruler' (p. xii 484). 4) On p. 138 of Vedārthasamgraha the Vākyakāra and Bhāsyakāra are quoted to show that they taught Brahman to possess qualities. (Cf. Śrībhāṣya p. ix 607 & xiii 575.) 5) Two quotations from Dramidabhaṣya (p. 299 & p. 400) speak of a Personal God (as Supporter of the worlds and Distributer of rewards). That something like 'lower Brahman' is not meant will be seen from the fact that in the second quotation the word atman is used to denote God.

Indeed, I admit the number of quotations is too scanty to enable us to arrive at any positive conclusion; but still I think that the above quotations do not leave us quite in the dark as to their views on the point in question. One point I should like to lay stress on is that these writers are referred to as Vṛttikāra, Vākyakāra, Bhāsyakāra and not by their proper names,¹ which shows that they were recognised as authorities in the Vedānta school and were not merely individual sectarians.

The only ancient complete document on Vedānta system which we possess, is the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, which besides possesses the merit of being equally authoritative to every follower of Vedānta, to whatever school of interpretation he may belong. The difficult problem of ascertaining the teachings of the Sūtras has been handled with admirable skill by Dr. Thibaut in the scholarly Introduction to his translation of the Vedānta Sūtras. (S. B. E. vol. XXXIV.) The result of his enquiry he sums up as follows: 'They (the Sūtras) do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman; they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Īkāra in Śaṅkara's sense; they do not, with Śaṅkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self' (p. c). 'The greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according

¹ The Bhāsyakāra is sometimes referred to by his name, Dramidācārya.
to Śaṅkara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge... We certainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what Śaṅkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Bādarāyaṇa's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none' (p. ci). Thibaut's conclusions are, as he himself says, only negative; but he is perfectly justified in drawing even from them the conclusion that 'the system of Bādarāyaṇa had greater affinities with that of the Bhāgavatas and Rāmānuja than with the one of which the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is the classical exponent'. Any further study on the same lines can only go to strengthen his conclusion.

The internal evidence of the Sūtras can be confirmed also by other considerations. Thus, for instance, Colonel Jacob in the Introduction to his edition of Vedāntasūtra (Bombay 1894) (p. viif.) points out the fact, that Śaṅkara again and again ignores the distinction which he draws between the higher (para) Brahman without attributes and the lower (apara) Brahman with attributes — a distinction which is of fundamental importance in his system; and remarks ,To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the viśiṣṭādevaitavādins, or some similar schools, were in possession of the field in Śaṅkara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system' (p. ix).

I should like to mention here one circumstance, which also points in the same direction, and to which Rāmānuja himself has referred. The Uttara-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta has been from ancient times known by the name of Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā as well as Brahmapāramahīmāṁsā, which certainly shows that Śārīraka (one possessing a body) was considered to be the principal denotation of Brahman. Rāmānuja remarks : — ,Every thing in this world, whether individual souls or material things, form the body of the Supreme Soul, and therefore He alone can be said to possess a body unconditionally.'

1 Unconditionally, because Brahman possesses the body without itself becoming a body of someone else. The individual souls possess bodies too, but they are themselves bodies of Brahman.
(nirupādhikāḥ śārīra ātma). For this very reason competent persons call the body of teachings (śāstra), having Brahman for its subject-matter, Śārīraka.¹ (xi 580.) That the name Śārīraka is old, can be seen, because we meet with it in a passage which Rāmānuja quotes from the Vṛttikāra. (vii 266.) Cf. also Śrutiprakāśikā xi 581: saṃhitam etac chārīrakam iti Vṛttikāravacah. And if the commentators of Śaṅkara are right in stating that some of their author's polemical remarks are directed against the Vṛttikāra, the latter must have lived before Śaṅkara (cf. Thibaut, loc. cit. p. xxi). But we have positive evidence that the name Śārīraka was in use long before Śaṅkara. For we meet with it in a passage which Śaṅkara himself quotes from 'revered' Upavarṣa in his commentary on Śūtra m. 3. 53. That Upavarṣa was an ancient and revered name is seen from the fact, that not only Śaṅkara, but even Śābara Śvāmin before him, apply to him (Upavarṣa) the appellation 'Bhagavat'. He is said to be the author of the Vṛtti on the Pārvamimāṃsā and from the passage quoted by Śaṅkara, it seems that he also wrote a commentary on the Śārīraka (Śārīrake vakṣyāmaḥ).

It will be a very valuable means to ascertain how the Vedānta teachings were understood in the early days, if we can find references to them in early Indian works. The first to come into consideration for this purpose are the Buddhistic and Jaina scriptures. But I am not aware of any reference in the former. Both the Brahmajāla and the Śāmaṇa-phalā Suttantas, which are specially known for the information they give of the 'heretical' doctrines, contain no distinct reference to the Vedānta school. The Tevijja-Suttanta, no doubt refers to the Vedic schools, which are said to teach the way, leading to the union with Brahman.¹ But it throws no light on what was understood by Brahman and what the way of being united with it, was.

¹ Prof. Rhys Davids thinks that here Brahmā, in the masculine, is to be understood and says that the neuter Brahman is unknown in the Nikāyas. (Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 298.)
But in the *Sutrakṛtāṅga*, the second *Āṅga* of the Jaina Canon, there are three passages which obviously refer to Vedānta. According to the first (r. 1. 1. 9), Vedānta teaches that as one lump of clay presents itself under many forms, so the Intelligent One (*Vinnū-Vijñā*) appears under various forms as the Universe. According to the second passage (n. 1. 26) the teaching of the Vedānta is: —

- Here all things have the Self for their cause and their object, they are produced by the Self, they are manifested by the Self, they are intimately connected with the Self, they are bound up in the Self.¹

This teaching is further explained by several illustrations. In the third passage (ii. 6. 47), the Vedānta distinguishes itself from the Jaina view in so far as it (Vedānta) assumes, an invisible, great eternal, imperishable and indestructible Soul, who excels all other beings in every respect, as the moon excels the stars.²

The special importance of the references in the *Sutrakṛtāṅga* lies in the fact, that they show us how Vedānta was understood even before our present Vedānta Sūtras were composed. The *Sutrakṛtāṅga*, being an *Āṅga*, belongs to the older portion of the Jaina Canon (cf. p. xl of the Introduction to the *S. B. E. vol. XLV*), and must be older than the Vedānta Sūtras, which, according to unanimous tradition refer more than once to the Bhagavad-Gītā, and by whose time the *Pāṇḍupatas*, the *Pāṇcarātras* and all the four Buddhist schools were definitely established.³

¹ Not only the thought, but even the mode of expression in this passage reminds of Rāmānuja.

² At this place as well as in the last passage I have quoted from Prof. Jacob's translation of the *Sutrakṛtāṅga* in *S. B. E. vol. XLV*.

³ It may however be stated that in 127 the opinion of Akṛiyāvādins is given thus: 'There rises no sun, nor does it set; there waxes no moon, nor does it wane; there are no rivers running, nor any winds blowing; the whole world is ascertained to be unreal'.

The original of the last line is: *vanijhe nie kasihe hu loe-bandho niyatah kṛtsnaḥ khalu lokah*. The ancient commentator is apparently right in ascribing this opinion to the *Śānyavādins* and not to the *Māyāvādins*. 
Of even more importance than this positive evidence is in this connection, I think, the negative argument. If such a peculiarly striking doctrine as that of Māyā had been at the time in existence, is it likely that it should have been altogether ignored in the earlier Buddhistic and Jaina works? In works like the *Brahmajāla Sutta*ta, where metaphysical questions of every imaginable variety are touched, the total absence of any reference to the Māyā-theory can only be understood on the assumption that it was at the time altogether unknown.

All these circumstances make it pretty certain that some centuries before as well as after Bādarāyaṇa, the Upaniṣads were not considered to teach the Māyā-system.

But here the question naturally arises whether the Upaniṣads taken by themselves, i.e. apart from the interpretations put on them, however ancient or authoritative, teach the Māyā-view or favour Rāmānuja's interpretation that Brahman is related to the world as the soul to the body. This question is very important, because the Upaniṣads are, after all, the ultimate authority for any system of Vēdānta. In the Upaniṣads there are no doubt a number of obscure passages, which would be unintelligible without the help of scholastic interpretations; but on the whole the texts are clear enough to enable us to form a correct idea of their general drift. And if one would directly approach the Upaniṣads, without allowing oneself to be influenced by the scholiasts, and without the intention of finding in them the thoughts of any particular system of philosophy, whether Indian or European, I don't think one would have a moment's hesitation in answering the above question in Rāmānuja's favour. From the days of Colebrooke the majority of Modern scholars has been of opinion that the Māyā-view is unknown to the Upaniṣads. Mr. Gough, who in his explanations of the Upaniṣads largely followed the commentators of Śaṅkara's school, advocated the opposite view. His arguments have been satisfactorily dealt with by Thibaut (loc. cit.), who showed that the chief passages, which are cited as teaching the Māyā-view, admit of easy interpretations, not in
any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world (pp. cxvii—cxx).

Thibaut also discusses the question of 'the true philosophy of the Upaniṣads apart from the system of the commentators'; and the conclusions he arrives at are: — 1) The Upaniṣads do not make the distinction between a higher and a lower Brahman, or between a saguna and a nirguna Brahman. (p. cxv.) 2) The Upaniṣads do not call upon us to look upon the whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge. (p. cxx.) 3) The doctrine according to which the soul is merely Brahma bhrāntam [a deluded Brahman] or Brahma māyopādhiκam [Brahman under the conditions of Māya] is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question.¹ (p. cxxi.) It will be to the point if I quote here also Thibaut's remarks concerning the Śaṅḍilyavidyā (Ch. Up. nr. 14): — This small Vidyā is decidedly one of the finest and most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman’s nature that Śaṅḍilya's thought was able to reach, is by Śaṅkara and his school declared to form part of the lower

¹ In one point in this connection, Thibaut thinks that Śaṅkara faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upaniṣads, viz therein that the soul of the 'sage' is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the Universal Self. (p. cxxi.) But I cannot quite agree with Thibaut's view. The origin of this idea lies in the teachings of Yājñavalkya. But he emphatically teaches that the powers of consciousness, which souls possess, are indestructible. (Br. Up. iv. 5. 14, iv. 3. 23—30.) When one is freed from all worldly desires (akāma) and sets one's heart on the Universal Soul (ātmakāma), then one is freed at death from the connection with the sense-organs (prāyās) and can rest in Brahman (iv. 4. 6), a state exactly similar to the state in which the soul is believed to exist in deep sleep (iv. 3. 21). There is no actual empirical consciousness (ii. 4. 12), but this is only because there is nothing different to be conscious of, and not because the souls cease to be conscious subjects (iv. 3. 23ff., iv. 4. 14). 'Consciousness is possible in this state' (alam vā are idam vijñānāya, ii. 4. 13). In Ch. Up. vii. 23 the same state is described in the same words, and according to Ch. Up. vii. 22 one enjoys bliss in it.
Vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities' (p. cxiv).

But the final conclusion of Thibaut's enquiry is such as one would hardly expect from the arguments he has brought forth. He says, 'The fundamental doctrines of Śaṅkara's system are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upaniṣads than those of other Vedāntic systems' (p. cxxiv). He thinks that in the Upaniṣads there are passages 'whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence' (p. cxxv). 'And as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature just on account of its own unreality' (p. cxxv). In short, according to Thibaut the theory of Māyā is the necessary consequence of the attempt to reconcile the appearance of the manifold world with the Upaniṣad teaching that Brahman was 'one undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence'.

The words 'undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence' no doubt faithfully render the phrases of Śaṅkara's school, but what exactly Thibaut understands by them, I do not know. I think Rāmānuja shows great philosophical insight, when he says that 'if no difference be involved, intelligence could not be what it is, it would be something altogether void, without any meaning' (Śrībhāṣya x 405). But does the conception of 'one undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence' at all come forth in the Upaniṣads? Can the logical steps be traced there or in the pre-upaniṣad Literature, which could have led to such a highly abstract, if not meaningless, conception? Do not the passages, which are believed to convey such an idea, admit of a more natural and easier interpretation? And to say that Māyā-doctrine is a natural consequence of this conception is, it seems to me, putting the cart before the horse. We naturally are conscious of plurality and distinctions, and in order to know that nothing but 'un-
differentiated mass of intelligence exists, the knowledge that all plurality is an illusion, must go before.¹

Further is it a piece of 'thoroughly consistent speculation' as Thibaut calls it, to accept the eternally undifferentiated Brahman as the only reality and to explain the appearance of the world by calling it 'a mere illusion, due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature, just on account of its own unreality'? It is unfortunately true that philosophical works contain more contradictions than those of any other kind! But even in philosophy I know of no sentence which is more fraught with inner contradictions than the above one. To try to explain the Māyā-view by the help of Schopenhauer's phenomenalism scarcely improves the matter, because Schopenhauer's system is equally beset with difficulties and contradictions.²

The other Upaniṣad conception, a 'thorough following out of which led to the development of Māyā, is, according to Thibaut, that 'the union with Brahman is to be reached through true know-

¹ The same reasoning applies, in my opinion, to the bold attempt, that Prof. Deussen is making to identify the teachings of the Upaniṣads with the system of Schopenhauer. He takes the word ātman (Soul), which in the Upaniṣads is generally used to denote the one active principle, which is immanent in the entire universe, through which all operations of the world, whether physical or psychical, are carried out, to mean 'the pure subject of knowledge' in Schopenhauer's sense, i.e. as existing 'without time, space, and causality'. In this way, whereas the Upaniṣads want to teach that all things exist only through the power of ātman (i.e. the Universal Soul), Prof. Deussen understands them to teach Schopenhauer's phenomenalism, viz 'the world is my idea'. And this phenomenalism, he wants us to understand to be the meaning of the Māyā-doctrine!

I am sorry I cannot for want of space enter into the details of Prof. Deussen's arguments. But I should like to note here one a priori argument which makes his interpretation at least doubtful. Schopenhauer's conception that 'the pure subject of knowledge' is the only existent reality, is intelligible only on the ground of his development of Kantian phenomenalism. But neither in the Upaniṣads nor in the literature preceeding them, do we meet with any considerations, that could lead to such a phenomenalism.

² Schopenhauer had brought all the caprices and contradictions of his nature into his philosophy.¹ Ed. Zeller.
ledge only' (p. cxxv). But what the Upaniṣads teach is, to use Thīrāut’s own words, ‘not that true knowledge sublates the false world, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world’ (p. cxx). The two ideas are entirely different. The Upaniṣads teach that when one by steady self-control has freed oneself from all worldly desires, and by habitual meditation and insight has realized the nature of Brahman and is attached to it, then at death one is united with Brahman and has not to enter a body again. (Mund. Up. iii. 2. 1—6, Br. Up. iii. 5, iv. 4. 6 f., Ch. Up. iii. 14, viii. 13 and several other places.) How such a conception could logically lead to the idea that the whole world is unreal, I must confess I cannot understand.

Another reason why Thīrāut thinks that Śaṅkara is more faithful to the spirit of the Upaniṣads is that the older Upaniṣads at any rate lay very little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being; and hence Śaṅkara is right, in so far as he assigns to his hypostatised personal Iśvara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman' (p. cxxiv). If by personal Iśvara is meant only an external god, like the gods of the Vedic times, or like the various gods of later mythology, certainly it is not the conception of the Upaniṣads of their Brahman or Ātman. And it is not also Rāmānuja’s conception. But if the question be asked if the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is eternally inactive, an undifferentiated mass of intelligence, (whatever these words may mean!), or if the Brahman produces and continually sustains the entire universe, I think the answer would be most decidedly in favour of the second alternative. But it is according to Śaṅkara only Māyā, an illusion! If there is any leading thought in the Upaniṣads, it is that Brahman is the only Power that works in every part and constituent of the universe. It is through the power of Brahman that winds blow and fire burns, the rivers, the sun and moon, the days and nights follow their appointed course. Brahman is entered within to the tip of the nails. It is inside all the elements in the world, inside all the heavenly bodies, inside all the constituents of man, ruling and controlling from within. Brahman is also the power within all ‘gods’, our sense-organs work through
the power of Brahman. Through Brahman we breathe our breath and think our thoughts. It is this thought of the immanence of Brahman in the world and in man, over which the authors of the Upaniṣads break into perpetual ecstasies. It is the one anthem which they are never tired of singing. Indeed in attempting to describe Brahman as the mysterious power that works within every thing, great or small, they find, as might be expected, all terms derived from experience inadequate; and therefore they often describe Brahman negatively; but this negative description is entirely a different thought from the one, which the Māyā-system implies.

In short nothing appears to me more foreign to the spirit of the Upaniṣads than the Māyā-doctrine. It perverts, as Thibaut himself has pointed out (p. cxx), their manifest sense. Indeed I do not want to deny that some passages from the Upaniṣads, if taken by themselves, i.e. detached from the context, will lend themselves to Māyā-interpretation; in other words if you bring a Śaṅkara or a Schopenhauer with you, you may discover something in them, that can be construed to imply Māyā. But then such passages can be discovered any where and not only in the Upaniṣads! only one has to take leave of all historical and critical methods of study, which after all are the only way to arrive at truth.

But if Māyā-doctrine is foreign to the Upaniṣads, how is the fact to be explained that Śaṅkara advocated with great success the view that Māyā formed the integral part of the Upaniṣad teachings? Nothing would be more absurd than to assert that Śaṅkara invented the whole Māyā-system and consciously misconstrued the Upaniṣads in order to gain authority for his teachings. Firstly, the Māyā-view is too unnatural to be the product of one head. It presupposes the speculative work of generations. Secondly we know that Gauḍāpāda had before taught Vedānta, which is not very different from that of Śaṅkara. And for aught we know there might have been others before Śaṅkara who held the same views regarding the teachings of

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1 e.g. Prof. Deussen finds fullblown Māyā in Rg Veda i. 164. 46!
the Upaniṣads. And lastly, on reading Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras, one can at once see that he was convinced that the Upaniṣads taught Māyā. How is it then to be accounted for that the Upaniṣads came to be believed to teach Māyā?

In the history of philosophy from the ancient times to the present day, we have ample evidence of cases, where into ancient and honoured texts thoughts have been read, which were perfectly foreign to it and which were the products of entirely different lines of thought. The numberless constructions that have been put on Kant’s teachings from the days of Fichte may serve as a modern illustration. Similarly if it can be shown that the Māyā doctrine was developed independent of the Upaniṣads and had gained in importance in India some time before Śaṅkara, the assertion that the conception of Māyā is foreign to the Upaniṣads, would gain greatly in force. Because if Māyā-view be in the atmosphere, it is not at all unlikely, that minds imbued with it, and still looking upon the Upaniṣads as the ultimate authority, should read it into them.

Now this in fact was the case. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the Mahāyānist schools of Buddhism, and especially that of the Mādhyamikas, had developed systems of philosophy, which were perfect prototypes of the later Māyā-system of Śaṅkara. I shall quote here from H. Kern, ‘Manual of Indian Buddhism’ p. 126 ff. a short passage indicating the drift of the teachings of the Mādhyamika school, also called ‘nihilists’ (śūnyavādins), and showing the striking analogy between them and Śaṅkara’s system: — ‘In their nihilism ...... they teach that the whole of the phenomenal world is a mere illusion. Like the scholastic Vedāntins they recognise two kinds of truth, the Paramārtha and the Śānvṛti, answering to the Paramārthika and the Vyāvahārika of the Vedānta. The second kind of truth is, properly speaking, no truth at all, for it is the produce of Reason

1 Yāmuna in his Siddhitraya (p. 5) mentions among the expounders of Vedānta, Bhārtṛprapāśica, Bhārtṛmitra, Bhārtṛhari and Brahmadatta, who, according to Rāma Miśra Śāstrin, lived before Śaṅkara, but belonged to the same herd (śāstuḥya).
(buddhi), and truth\(^1\) lies outside the domain of Reason; Reason is Sāṃvṛti. Hence, in fact, all is delusion, dream-like. There is no existence, there is no cessation of being, there is no nirvāṇa, there is no difference between those who have attained Nirvāṇa and those who have not. All conditions, in fact, are like dreams.\(^*\) The Śūnyavāda is, as Kern points out, 'the legitimate logical out-come of the principles underlying ancient Buddhism' (loc. cit.). Here we can understand the philosophical significance of, as well as the line of arguments which led to, the doctrine of Māyā, which, if we take Śaṅkara by himself, remains perfectly unintelligible.

\(^*\) In the sixth and seventh centuries the Buddhist scholasticism had its palmy days (Kern, 'Manual' p. 130). We hear of many learned Brāhmans having turned Buddhists at that time. And in all probability in those days the Buddhist ideas made their influence felt on the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. Then in the 8th century came Śaṅkara. He appropriated for the Vedānta all that was at the time considered of high philosophical value, and fought the Buddhists with their own weapons. His remarkable dialectic powers contributed greatly to the downfall of Buddhism in India. But very often the conqueror turns out in reality to be the vanquished; and so it was in this case. The Nirvāṇa of Nāgārjuna came out triumphant under the new name of Śaṅkara's highest Brahman. The Buddhist denial of the existence of soul (anātmavāda) asserted itself in the teaching that the 'sense of I' was only an Illusion. Several terms, like avidyā, nāmarūpa got impressed with Buddhistic meanings. The results of the Buddhistic speculations on Pratītyasamutpāda and Buddhi became concentrated in Māyā, a term not unknown to Buddhistic philosophy.

That the Māyā system was 'Buddhistic nihilism in disguise' did not fail to be noticed in India from early times. According to Dr. Bhandarkar (Report 83—84) the Vedāntists of the Mādhva School call the Māyāvādins 'Buddhists in disguise' (pracchanna-

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\(^1\) It is Nirvāṇa, of which nothing positive can be predicated.
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

The same remark was made before them by Rāmānuja (s. ii. 2. 27). And even before him Yāmuna quotes in his Siddhātraya (p. 19) two verses, one from the 'open Buddhists' (prakāṭa-saugataś) attributing the 'false' distinction between subject and object of knowledge (grāhya and grāhaka) to Buddhī (Reason), and the other from 'Buddhists in disguise' attributing the same distinction to Māyā. Then in Padmapurāṇa Uttara Khaṇḍa 43 (Aufrecht's Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in Oxford p. 14 note 1) we have 'The Māyā theory is a false doctrine, "Buddhism in disguise":

māyāvādam asacchāstram praçchannam bauddham ucyate.

The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

In Vedārthasaṁgraha (p. 7) Rāmānuja says, 'The purpose of Vedānta (i.e. the Upaniṣads) texts is to destroy the peril of transmigration to which those individual souls (jīvātman) are helplessly exposed, who, as a result of the mass of good and evil deeds (karman), done through beginningless 'nescience' (avidyā), have been conjoined to various kinds of bodies, and who identify themselves erroneously with them (i.e. the bodies). This purpose they (the Vedānta-texts) accomplish by teaching: 1. the true nature and qualities of the individual souls as disconnected from bodies. 2. the true nature and qualities of the Supreme Soul, who is their (i.e. of the individual souls) inward Controller; and 3. the ways of worshipping the Supreme Soul, which lead to the disclosure of the true nature of the individual souls and to the infinitely blissful realisation of Brahman.' Following this conception of Rāmānuja, I shall divide the Teachings of Vedānta in three chapters: the first dealing with the nature of Brahman, the second with the nature of the individual souls and the third with the subject of the final release (mokṣa).

1 For this reference I am indebted to Prof. De la Vallée Poussin.
Chapter I.

Nature of Brahman.

Rāmānuja says that Brahman exists in, and is to be meditated on, as having three forms: — 1) Brahman in its own nature (śvarūpena), i.e. as the cause of the entire world; 2) Brahman as having for its body (i.e. as the Soul of) all the suffering souls¹ (bhokṣṭr); 3) Brahman as having for its body (i.e. as the Soul of) the objects² and of the instruments of suffering.³ (p. xii. 387, ³Ved. Saṅg. p. 138). The objects and instruments of suffering constitute the entire material world. So it will be convenient to divide R.’s teachings concerning the nature of Brahman under three heads, 1) B. in its own nature, 2) B. as the Soul of the individual souls, and 3) B. as the Soul of the material world.

1. Brahman in its own nature.

The word Brahman is, according to R., derived from the root brh (to grow), and means anything that possesses greatness (brhattva); but it primarily denotes that which possesses unsurpassable (infinite) greatness in its nature as well as in its qualities; and such can only be the Lord of all (sārveśvara). (p. x. 361 and p. vii. 209 f.). Because unconditioned greatness (etc.) is possible only in the universal Soul,¹ (p. 62.) Hence the word B. denotes the “Highest Person” (Purusottama), who in His nature is devoid of every imperfection and possesses numberless qualities of unsurpassable excellence.² (p. vii. 207.)

¹ Bhokṣṭr is one who experiences the fruit of one’s former acts (karman). The word is generally translated by ‘an enjoying soul’. But even where the fruit of the acts (karman) is, from the worldly point of view, pleasant, it is from the point of view of the final release something entirely undesirable; and hence is rather a ‘suffering’ than an enjoyment.

² The objects of suffering are the material objects with which the souls are surrounded; and the instruments of suffering are the bodies and sense-organs which they possess. The sole purpose of the entire material world is conceived to be that of requiting the souls for their past acts or Karman.

³ For the explanation of the references see p. 129, note 1.
things are to be noticed here: 1stly B. is a Person, and not to be considered as impersonal, and 2ndly B. is not without qualities. What R. understands by 'person' (Purusā) may be seen from the fact that he ascribes unconditioned 'Personality' to the Universal Soul only (p. xiii. 283). By a person he understands one who possesses the power to realize one's wishes and purposes (sattyakāma & sattyasaṁkalpa. Ch. Up. viii. 1. 5). The individual souls also possess this power (Ch. Up. viii. 7. 1) and therefore they are 'persons' (purusās). But their power is conditioned¹ or limited as long as they are not freed from the necessity of transmigration, which R. always expresses by saying that they have 'apurusārthas' i.e. want of the powers of a person, because they are compelled to suffer the consequences of their karman.²

Brahman is defined in Sū. i. 1. 2 as 'the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world'. In order to understand exactly what R. means by this definition we must bear two things in mind: — 1stly creation does not mean creation out of nothing, nor does dissolution mean dissolution into nothing; and 2ndly, creation, sustenance and dissolution are not brought about by an external agent; they are acts from inside, immanent.

The following considerations will make this point clear. R. knows nothing of absolute creation or of absolute dissolution. When one says that some thing did not exist (asadvya-padeśa) (e.g. when one says that jars, plates etc. did not exist in the morning), what is meant is not that there was absolute non-existence (tucchata) of that something, but that it existed before in a different form and had different qualities (e.g. the plates, jars etc. existed as a lump of clay.). (p. 358). 'Existence (sattva) and non-existence (asattva) are attributes of a substance.' (p. 358, cf. Sū. ii. 2. 31. p. 443). When a substance possesses qualities that enable it to be called a certain thing, there is the existence of that thing; but when the substance possesses

¹ The meaning of 'conditioned' will be given below.
qualities other than these, then there is the non-existence of this thing¹ (p. 354). Thus for instance when clay possesses a broad base and the shape of a belly, then we say that a jar exists, but if that clay has the shape of potsherds etc., we say that the jar does not exist. Thus reasoning tells us that non-existence means assumption of different attributes. Besides this kind of (relative) non-existence (asattva) no (absolute) non-existence (tucchata) is conceivable (pp. 358 & 59).

Thus, if previous non-existence of anything is incomprehensible, it follows that creation or destruction in the strict sense of the words is equally incomprehensible. They must therefore be understood in a relative sense. Thus R. says, creation (uttpatti) and destruction are different states of the same causal substance (p. 344). That which already exists, is created¹ (sata evo’tpattiḥ). This paradoxical statement is thus explained: — ,When a substance (dravya) undergoes different states in succession, there occurs the "destruction" of the substance in the previous state, and the "creation" of the substance in the present state, but the substance remains the same in all its states (p. 345).

To such considerations R. is led by his acceptance of the old orthodox doctrine of ‘Satkāryavāda’, i.e. the doctrine that the effect (kārya) is existent in the cause (kāraṇa)¹. (kāraṇe kāryasya sattvam) or that the effect is non-different from the cause¹ (kāraṇād ananyat kāryam). This conception of the relation between cause and effect has probably its origin in the teachings of the sixth chapter of the Ch. Up. This chapter aims at teaching that the world is not different from Brahman, and that by knowing Brahman the world becomes known. The kind of oneness between the world and Brahman is illustrated in the first section of this chapter by three examples. ,By knowing one clod of clay all things made of clay are known; (because they have) "beginning with speech, modification, name" (vācārambhāyaḥ viṁśitaḥ vākāro nāmadheyaḥ), but the only truth is that they are clay¹. The other two examples are : 1. By knowing one ball of copper everything made of copper is known; and 2. by knowing one pair

¹ vyavahārayogātā hi sattvam. virodhi vyavahārayogyatā tadvyavahārayogyasya- sattvam. Cf. also p. 358, sattvadharmaḥ dharmāntaram asattvam.
of nail-scissors everything made of iron is known. On these passages the Vedānta doctrine of the non-difference of the effect from the cause or Satkāryavāda\textsuperscript{1} is grounded. But the interpretation put on them, especially on the four words vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam are very divergent, and hence the accounts given of the Satkāryavāda vary considerably from each other. Śaṅkara interprets these words as follows (Brahmasūtras ii. 1. 14) : — 'The modification (vikāra) originates and exists merely in speech. In reality there is no such a thing as effect. It is merely a name and therefore unreal.' But one could easily see that the words in question do not at all warrant such a conclusion. Literally translated the words mean 'beginning with speech, a modification, a name.' But that the modification originates merely in speech and is merely a name is Śaṅkara's own addition; and therefore that the effect does not exist in reality is an unwarrantable conclusion. There is not a single word here, as R. says (Ved. Saṅg. p. 53), that denies reality to the modification. Śaṅkara says (B. S. ii. 1. 14) that only by accepting the unreality of the effect could we understand the oneness of the cause and effect. But R. says this is exactly what we cannot do. For the real and the unreal cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is unreal or that the world is real\textsuperscript{1} (p. 350). Śaṅkara's view may more properly be termed Satkāraṇavāda and cannot be called by the old name of Satkāryavāda. But it is not even Satkāraṇavāda; because in order that a kāraṇa (cause) may be a kāraṇa, there must be a kārya (effect). Śaṅkara's view is only Sanmātravāda; it denies reality to all change and so to all causality. Also the corollary of the Satkāryavāda viz. by knowing the cause you know the effect, looses all its meaning, as R. points out (Ved.-Saṅg. p. 18 & 54), if Śaṅkara's interpretation be accepted. For if the effect be unreal, there is nothing to be known.

There are one or two considerations, which R. has not mentioned, but which would help us to understand the meaning of the expression

\textsuperscript{1} This doctrine is accepted also by the Śāmkhya system. The Vedāntists of the Mādhva school, however, reject it.
vācārambhanaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ, and thus enable us to determine what, according to the Ch. Up., should be understood by Satkārtyavāda.

Firstly, the expression vācārambhanaṃ etc. has been again used four times in the fourth section of the same chapter. The context helps us here to understand the sense in which it is used. In section 2 it is stated that the Original Being (Sat) created Light, Light created Water, Water created Food. In section 3 the Divinity (viz. sat) forms a resolve to make these three substances, viz. Light, Water and Food, tripartite and to distinguish them by names and forms; and then does accordingly. Making tripartite means, as the following section shows, mixing up the three substances, so that every part of the mixture will be made up of all the three. Distinguishing by means of names and forms is in the Upanisads, as it has been ever since in Indian philosophy, an act of individualizing. Compare Br. Up. 1. 4. 7. Then this (i.e. the Cosmos) was undistinguished (i.e. was a chaos). Only through name and form is it distinguished, so that (we say) this one has such and such a name and such and such a form. To loose name and form is to loose individuality; cf. Mu. Up. iii. 2. 5 Pr. Up. vi. 5. Thus to distinguish anything by name and form means to make individual things out of it. Then we see in the Upanisads that the activity of creation or of evolving many out of one, is generally preceded by a resolve on the part of the Creator, expressing itself in words like. I shall be many, I shall create worlds cf. Ait. Up. 1. 1. 3, iii. 1, Tait. Up. ii. 6. Ch. Up. vi. 2. 3 & 4, Br. Up. i. 2. 1 and 4 and several other places. Compare also how in Ch. Up. vii. 4 a series of resolves (saṅkalpa) brings the whole order of the world into existence. Thus in our text also the act of distinguishing the mass of light, water and food by name and form is begun with a resolve on the part of the Divinity to do so. Then we have in the fourth section In fire the red form (colour) is the form of light, the white form is the form of water, the black form is the form of food.

1 Cf. ṚgVeda x. 129. 4. First of all arose in him (the First born) desire, which was the first seed of mind. It was the bond between non-being and being. In Brāhmaṇas too Prajāpati first wishes and then creates.
The "fire-hood" of fire vanishes "beginning with speech, modification, name." The truth is that it is the three forms (viz. of light, water and food). The same thing is then said of the sun, the moon, and the lightening, viz., their red form is the form of light, the white of water, the black of food. The "sunhood" etc. of the sun etc. vanishes "beginning with speech, modification, name." The truth is that they are the three forms. These passages obviously teach (as is clearly expressed in the next two following sentences) that all individual things like fire, sun etc. are made out of light, water and food, just as the following section teaches that all the constituents of man are made up of the same three elements. Apart from these elements, the individual things vanish. But we have seen how the individual things were made out of these three elements. Firstly there was a resolve by the Divinity and then they were given names and forms. This is, it seems to me, what is implied by the expression 'beginning with speech, modification, name'. For instance, when it is said in 4. that fire has 'beginning with speech, a modification, a name', it means, I think, that the making of fire out of the three elements was begun with a resolve by the Divinity expressing itself in speech 'I shall distinguish by name and form' (vācārambhaṇam); then it was actually accomplished by the Divinity giving a particular name (nāma = nāmadheya) and a particular form (ṛūpa = vilāra). If this interpretation be right, the meaning of 4. 1—4 is that fire, sun etc. are nothing but light, water and food, only they have received a different name and a different form by the wish of the Divinity. But there is not the least ground to suppose that this receiving of a different 'name and form' is unreal. On the contrary it is expressly stated in 3. 3 that the Divinity did distinguish by 'name and form' (cf. x 105 f.). Applying this reasoning to the illustrations in 1. 4—6, the meaning e. g. in the first case, would be: by knowing one clod of clay, all things made of clay (jars, plates etc.) are known, because they (i. e. jars etc.) have their beginning in a resolve (e. g. by a potter) and have a different name and a different form. But the truth is that they in substance are all clay.
Hence the Satkārayavāda, that is based on this passage in the Ch. Up., can only mean that an effect (or an effected thing) is the same as the cause (or the causal substance) with a different name and in a different form. And this is exactly what R. understands by it (Ved. Saṅg. p. 53). He understands the expression vācārambhāṇam vikāro nāmadheyam in a slightly different way from the one I have indicated above. ārambhāṇam he says, is the same as ālambhāṇam = touch; and vācā he explains by vākpūrvakeṇa vyavahāreṇa hetunā = for the sake of that, which is preceded by speech, viz. vyavahāra i.e. 'practical use'. So that according to him the expression means, in order to be of practical use (the causal substance) touches (i.e. assumes) a particular name and a particular form (p. 342). But according to him the effects are real and they are produced by the same substance assuming different forms (Ved. Saṅg. p. 53).

The tenet of the Satkārayavāda, according to R., is: — 'An effect is the same as the cause, which has attained to a different condition' (p. 187) or as he expresses on p. 355, 'The causal substance in a different condition is the effect'. Between the cause and its effect there is oneness as far as the substance is concerned, and there is difference as far as the qualities and the form are concerned. But this difference there must be, or else these relation between cause and effect would be unknown (p. 275). The cause and effect may have common attributes (sālakṣaṇya), for instance in gold (the cause) and ear-ring (the effect), where the characteristics of gold are seen in both. But this is not necessary. The cause and effect can have different attributes (vāilakṣaṇya); for instance, cowdung (the cause) and scorpions (the effect) or, honey and worms. But still the same substance must be present in both, e.g. the constituent element, 'earth' that was present in cowdung is present in the scorpion (pp. 355 & 56, p. 277). The Vaiśeṣika school does not admit the Satkārayavāda on the grounds that cause and effect (e.g. clay and jar, or threads

1 In Ved. Saṅg. (p. 53) the expression is explained as meaning, 'The same substance is "touched" by a different usage vyavahāra a different form and a different name.'
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

and cloth) are objects of different ideas (buddhi), are indicated by different words (śabda), are used for different purposes (kārya), come into existence at different times (kāla), have different forms (ākāra) and different number (saṅkhyā). Further in order to change the cause into the effect the activity of an agent is necessary (p. 306). But R. says that by admitting that the cause and effect have different states (avasthā) or different shapes (saṃsthāna) all these differences (viz. of idea, word etc.) as well as the activity of the agent can be accounted for (p. 344); and therefore it is unreasonable to assume a change of the cause, of which we know nothing (p. 356). To the objection, that by admitting that a non-existing state is originated (viz. in the effect) he contradicts Satkāryavāda¹, R. answers, the states are incapable of being apprehended and handled apart from the substance to which they belong (and hence they cannot be said to be originated); what originates etc. is that which possesses the states (i. e. the substance)². But as explained above, 'origination' is a particular state of the ever-existing substance. Thus, 'even if we admit 'origination', the Satkāryavāda is not contradicted' (p. 345).

Thus we see that creation in its usual sense, i.e. creation out of nothing, is rejected by R. as inconceivable. But in Sūtra 1. 1. 2 Brahma is described as the cause from which the world proceeds. In what sense then does the world proceed from B.? Are we to understand that matter exists by the side of B. and that B. only shapes the world out of it? In other words, are we to understand that the material cause of the world is outside of B. and that B. is only its efficient cause? To this question R.'s answer is decidedly in the negative. B. is at once the material as well as the efficient cause (Sūtras 1. 4. 23 ff. Ved. Saṁg. p. 55 f. Gītā xiii. 2).

R. emphatically rejects the existence of matter (Pradhāna or Prakṛti) and of individual souls independent of B. In the beginning there was B. one only, without a second. Here lies the point of disagreement between him and the Sāmkhya philosophy, though with the details of that system R. agrees (pp. 85 & 99). Thus for instance, in Sū. ii. 3. 9 he describes the world as comprising ,Avyakta, Mahat,
Ahaṁkāra, tanmātrās, indriyas, sky, air etc. (cf. also Ved. Saṅg. p. 110). Then he says (p. 140) 'the (soul) by erroneously imputing to himself the attributes of Prakṛti, becomes the cause of the modifications of the latter'. Also the order of evolution, accepted by R., is almost the same as that of Sāṅkhya (Sū. ii. 3. 15). The Prakṛti is said to possess the three Guṇas. (Gītā xiv. 5; p. xii. 82, p. 190). Then he agrees with Sāṅkhya in admitting the existence of many Puruṣas; and in this point he thinks the Sāṅkhya is more reasonable than the Vedāntic schools of absolute non-dualism (Śaṅkara, Bhāskara etc.); the latter, he says, are beset with the same difficulties as the Sāṅkhya, but as they moreover deny the plurality of souls, they make themselves all the more absurd (p. 410 f.). The difficulties which, according to R., the Sāṅkhya cannot solve, are that, in as much as the Prakṛti (matter) is unconscious (jāda) and the Puruṣas are eternally without activity and without change, and thus as there is no conscious operating cause, the periodical origination (sṛṣṭi) and dissolution (pralayā) of the world cannot be properly explained; nor could the suffering and release of the Puruṣas be accounted for (Sū. ii. 1. 10 and ii. 2. 1—9).

But R. has not made an attempt to show by arguments why the view, that B. acts from out-side on an eternally and independently existing Prakṛti and thus produces the world, is unreasonable. In Sū. i. 4. 23 and ii. 1. 3, where he refutes the theistic Sāṅkhya and Yoga, which hold this view, he only says that such a view contradicts the teachings of the śruti. And 'in supersensuous matters the Scriptures are the only authority, and reasoning is to be used only to confirm it' (p. 289). The Scriptures emphatically reject any duality of principles previous to the creation. Cf. Ait. Up. i. 1, Ch. Up. vi. 2. 1 Br. Up. i. 4. 11 & 17 etc., where it is said 'in the beginning all this was Brahman (also called Atman [Self], Sat [Being]), one only'; the Chāndogya Upaniṣad adds further 'without a second', which, R. says, is intended to negative the existence of any 'operating cause' besides this 'one Being' (p. ix. 312, x. 362). In the accounts of creation in Ch. Up. vi. 2, and Tait. Up. ii. 6 we have 'It (i. e. Brahman) thought, I shall be many'. Which, R. remarks, shows that B. makes the world
out of itself (Sū. i. 4. 24, p. 194); or, as in explaining Tait. Up. ii. 7 he says, B. is both the object and the agent in the act of creation (Sū. i. 4. 26, p. 195).

These texts, as well as the text of the Satkāryavāda, viz., 'by knowing one, everything is known' (Ch. Up. vi. 1. 3. Br. Up. ii. 4. 5), preclude us from accepting the existence of anything apart from Brahman. In other words B. is not only the efficient but also the material cause of world. But this according to the Satkāryavāda would mean that B., the cause, is the same as the world, the effect; only it has assumed another state. Such a conclusion is further confirmed by several Upaniṣad-texts, e. g. Ch. Up. iii. 14. 1, vii. 25. 2, Br. Up. ii. 4. 6, Mai. Up. iv. 6 etc., which declare that this world is Brahman. Several texts again negative all plurality: cf. Br. ii. 4. 6, iv. 4. 19 etc.

But we know that the world comprises Souls, who are merged in ignorance and suffering, and matter, which is without consciousness and always changing. Now if the world be the same as Brahman, the suffering of the individual souls and the unconsciousness of matter will have to be attributed to B., a conclusion which, of course, cannot possibly be accepted (cf. p. 365, Sū. ii. 1. 23). Śaṅkara avoids such a conclusion by declaring that the only reality is Brahman, which is nothing but eternally undifferentiated, objectless consciousness, and that all plurality of things and individual souls is nothing but illusion. But such a slap-dash method is not only revolting to all human experience, not only is it involved in a mesh of inner contradictions, which R. has again and again clearly pointed out; but also it is in direct opposition to by far the greater — nearly the whole mass of the teachings of the Upaniṣads, which Śaṅkara escapes only by branding them with the name of ,lower knowledge' (aparā vidyā). But R. says that if we rightly grasp the relation between the world and B. as taught by the Upaniṣads, we shall see that the transformation into the world not only leaves it free from all evils, but brings unalloyed glory to it (p. xii. 483, p. 196 etc.).

'All Upaniṣads' says R., 'teach that the entire world, whether in a gross state on in a subtle one, and comprising both souls and
matter, is the body of B.' (p. 284). Compare the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa (Br. Up. iii. 7) where it is taught that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, the regions, moon and stars, space, darkness, light, all elements, breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, and semen are the body of Brahman and are controlled by it from within. The Mādhyaṇḍina recension reads 'soul' in the place of 'knowledge' and adds 'worlds, sacrifices and Vedas' to the list. The parallel passage in the Subāla Up. adds further 'buddhi, ahaṁkāra, citta, avyakta, akṣara, and lastly death'. Thus we see that according to these texts all gross elements, all the parts of the soul's psychological apparatus, the souls themselves (see Su. i. 2. 21, p. xiii. 125), Vedas, ceremonies, and the subtler elements, all are said to be the body of B. in so far as they are controlled by it from within. Compare also Ch. Up. vi. 8. 7 'all this (world) has this (viz. Brahman) for its Soul'; Tait. Ār. iii. 24. 'Entered within, the controller of beings, the Soul of all'. In the accounts of creation (Ch. Up. vi. 2 f. Br. Up. i. 4. Tait. Up. ii. 6 etc.) it is said that Brahman entered the whole world before distinguishing it into individual things. In the Tait. passage (ii. 6) it is expressly stated, (according to R.'s interpretation, p. xi. 533), that B. entered the material things (acetana) as also the individual souls; (cf. especially vijñānam avijñānam ca). There are again various places like Mu. Up. ii. 1. 4, Ch. Up. v. 18, where the whole universe is declared to be the body of B., and B. the soul of everything, in whom everything is woven like warp and woof (Br. Up. iii. 8).

But how is the relation between body and soul to be understood? By 'body'. R. says, is not necessarily meant something that has a particular shape, or that depends on breath for its existence, or that possesses organs of sense, or that is the cause of giving pleasure or pain (p. 284 f.). As implied in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa ('controls from within') R. defines 'body' as 'any substance which a conscious being (acetana) completely controls and supports for its own purpose and whose only nature consists in being subservient to the conscious being' (p. 286). 'The whole world with its souls and matter is the body of Brahman, because it is completely controlled and supported
by Brahman and has the only nature of being subservient to it.  
Taken in this sense the world is more properly a 'body' to Brahman  
than our body is to us; because 'in diseases etc. our controlling power  
is met with obstructions' (p. 286).

One or two things deserve to be noticed in connection with this  
conception of Brahman having the world for its body.

Firstly what it does not mean: — Connection with a body is  
generally held to be undesirable, because it is the cause of pain and  
suffering and limits the soul's natural powers of knowledge (p. 297).  
But having the world for its body does not cause B. any suffering.  
Because, R. explains, 'it is not the connection with a body as such  
that causes a soul to suffer pain or pleasure; pain and pleasure are  
the consequences of his past karman. But B. is entirely free from  
karman' (xii. 582 and p. 298). Therefore there is not the least pos-

sible occasion for it to suffer pain. On the contrary as it shows its  
wonderful controlling-power it adds to its glory. Then we have not  
to understand that, because all the things in this world are a 'body'  
to B., therefore they are its 'form' (rupa), just as the body of an  
individual soul is its form. B. is in the things but remains in them  
'as it were' without a form (ruparahitatulyam eva). Because it is B.  
who brings about 'names and forms' and hence it is above them  
(p. 676). But this must not be understood to mean that B. has no  
form (rupa) whatsoever. On the contrary in accordance with Ch. Up.  
1. 6. 6, Tt. Up. iii. 8, Gitā viii. 9 etc., R. distinctly says that B. has a  
wonderful divine form, possessing eternal, unsurpassable and infinite  
lustre, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, charm, youth and so on. (p. xii. 82).  
But it is not the result of Karman, nor is it made of matter (Prakṛti).  
And when B. incarnates itself, as it in its compassion often does  
(Gaud. Ka. iii. 24, Mu. Up. ii. 2. 6, Gitā iv. 5) in order to show fa-
vour to its devotees, it transforms this very form into that of a ce-

lestlal being (deva), man etc., without at the same time abandoning  
its characteristic nature (xiii. 354, Gitā iv. 6).

Secondly we have to note what this conception of the world  
as 'body' of B. implies. According to the definition of 'body' given
above, its essence consists in being subservient to the soul embodied in it. This means that a body cannot have an existence independent of the soul. Just as class characteristics (jāti) cannot exist independent of an individual of the class, or just as a quality cannot exist independent of the substance which it qualifies, so a body cannot exist independent of the soul embodied in it. The connection between the soul and body is not like that between a man and his walking-stick or his ear-ring. Because the walking-stick or the ear-ring can exist independently of the man, but the body cannot. On this account body is nothing more than a ‘mode’ prakāra of the soul. That ‘body’ is a ‘mode’ of the soul, just as a quality or generic characteristics are modes of a substance, is seen from the following facts: — 1) The soul is the only substrate of the body, because when the soul departs, the body perishes. 2) the soul is the only final cause (prajojana) of the body, because the body exists only to give pleasure, pain etc. to the soul. 3) The body is known only as a distinguishing attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of the soul. Because all souls being alike, the distinction between them as a man or a woman, or as a celestial or a human being or an animal, can only belong to the bodies they occupy.

Now just as the word ‘cow’ (which is only a generic name) implies the idea of an individual in whom the class-characteristics of a cow inhere; or just as the word ‘white’ implies the idea of a thing possessing the white colour; so the word indicating a body (a celestial being [deva], man, cow etc.) implies the idea of the soul embodying it. We may use the word ‘body’ independently, but we use it just as we may use ‘whiteness’, ‘cow-ness’ etc. i.e. only through abstraction (niṣkaraṇa); but primarily the world ‘body’ has its meaning only in reference to the soul embodied in it. And as a matter of fact in our daily life, as well as in the Veda, words denoting only bodies are used to denote the souls in them as well. For instance we say ‘a particular soul has been born a man or a woman’; where man

1 R. explains what he understands by ‘mode’ thus: — ‘when we say “this is such”, the idea conveyed by “such” is a mode of the thing expressed by “this” in so far as it can exist only relative to it’ (p. xi. 535).
or woman denote the soul occupying the man's or woman's body. This usage is perfectly justifiable, because the bodies are merely the 'modes' of the souls; and where one term expresses a 'mode' belonging to a thing expressed by another term, the two terms can stand in Sāmānādikaraṇya (i.e. in apposition with each other, or one can here say, 'in the relation of subject and predicate'). For instance we say 'Khaṇḍa is an ox', where the term 'ox' expresses class characteristics and therefore is a 'mode' of 'Khaṇḍa' which is the name of a particular ox; or we say 'the cloth is white', where white being a quality is a 'mode' of cloth. Similarly it is quite right to say 'the soul is a man', where 'man' denotes a body and therefore is a 'mode' of the soul embodied in it (pp.x.257—264, xi.534—538. Ved. Saṅg. pp. 107—110).

Now we have seen that the Upaniṣads teach us that the entire world is the body of Brahman, who is its Soul. According to what has been just said, this means that the world and all things in it, whether physical or psychical, can exist only as 'modes' of B. It is only as 'body' of B. that the world derives its reality (vastutevā). Hence all words denoting the things in this world must at the same time signify B., in so far as it has these things for its 'body' or 'modes' (x.217). 'For instance words like 'cow', 'horse', 'man' etc., though they denote shapes only, imply the bodies in which these shapes inhere and to whom they are therefore related as 'modes'; but these bodies imply the individual souls whose 'modes' they are; and at last these souls imply B., because they exist only as its 'modes'.

In this way it will be seen that all words in the end express

1 This illustration shows that according to R. there is strictly speaking only one 'Substance' viz. B. Individual souls are 'modes' of B. and matter is mode of individual souls, just as class-characteristics, qualities (colour, taste etc.) etc. are 'modes' of matter. In what sense matter or material bodies are 'modes' of souls will be seen below.

This doctrine of one Substance having everything in the world for its 'modes' sounds like that of Spinoza; but it should be remembered that the 'modes' here are not related to the Substance in an analytical and logical way, as Spinoza thinks, but possess a real existence of their own, though entirely controlled by and dependent on the 'Substance'.

3
Brahman,¹ and therefore can in their primary sense be used as predicates of B.² (p. 115, Ved. Saṅg. p. 30). In other words we are justified in saying that anything whatsoever is B. It is in this sense that the expression 'all this is B.' (Ch. Up. iii. 14. 1, Br. Up. i. 4. 6 etc.) is to be understood. 'All this' viz. the world is B., in so far as it is the 'body' or 'mode' of B. The world is one with B., not because it is B. in itself (svarūpaṇa), but because B. is the Soul² and the world the Body (Ved. Saṅg. p. 33). As explained above the unity between the world and B. is like the unity between a quality and the thing it qualifies. The world is B. because it can exist only as 'mode' of B., i.e. apart from B. it can have no existence. To affirm this kind of unity is the purpose of the texts which deny the existence of plurality (Br. Up. ii. 4. 6, iv. 4. 19 etc.). They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality which is brought about in B. by its own resolve 'may I be many' (Ch. Up. vi. 2. 3) (p. ix. 351 f.).

The same reasoning is to be applied in order to understand the meaning of the celebrated Upaniṣad formula 'tāt tvam asi' (thou art that). In this sentence both 'thou' and 'that' signify B.; 'that' signifies B. as the cause of the entire world, and 'thou' signifies B. in so far as it controls from within and hence has 'thou', i.e. this particular individual soul, for its body (x. 204, xi. 479, Ved. Saṅg. 32, Gitā xviii. 2) 'Thou' apparently denotes an individual soul, but a soul being the 'body' of B. is only its 'mode' and therefore incapable of existing and acting apart from it, and so it denotes B. as well³. (Ved. Saṅg. p. 35). Thus while the soul is a 'mode' of B., and while, as explained above, a 'mode' can stand in sāmānādhisuparaṇya (i.e. in the relation of predicate to subject) with the substance to which it belongs, an individual soul can stand in sāmānādhisuparaṇya with B.;

¹ For this reason, R. says, the science of etymology is completed only after knowing Vedānta (Ved. Saṅg. p. 38).

² Cf. Tait. Up. ii. 6. 'Having created all this, he entered it; and having entered it, he became 'Sat' and 'tyat'. It is through entering i.e. by being the soul, that B. becomes the world.

Compare Br. Up. i. 5. 21 as an illustration of this way of thinking. See the note below.
in other words we can predicate B. of an individual soul and say ,thou (i. e. a particular soul) art B.' (x. 266 r. Ved. Saṅg. p. 110).

The sentence ,thou art that' teaches, it is argued by the absolute non-dualists, that the individual soul is B. and nothing but B. There can be no difference between the two; or else their being placed in sāmānādhikaranya would have no meaning. When two words are placed in this relation, they are meant to convey the sense of unity; and in order to grasp this unity we must ignore the special characteristics of the two. Thus when it is said ,This is that Devadatta', in order that we may understand the unity between the subject and the predicate, we must altogether ignore ,this-ness' and ,that-ness' from the two respectively, so that the idea conveyed by the sentence is Devadatta, and Devadatta alone. If we do not give up ,this-ness' and ,that-ness' the subject and the predicate would be different and thus there would arise contradiction between the two, and the sentence would be meaningless. Similarly in the sentence ,thou art that' the distinctions of ,thou' and ,that' are to be ignored; they are false distinctions, products of nescience; the truth that the sentence teaches us, is that there is nothing but pure B., B. without any distinctions (Ved. Saṅg. 43).

Against such a view R. answers, that the very fact that the individual soul and B. are placed in sāmānādhikaranya (i. e. as subject and predicate), presupposes some difference between the two; that if the special distinctions conveyed by the words are to be ignored, and if the object be merely to convey the idea of a purely undistinguished thing, no reason is left for employing several words; only one word could do it. Thus the raison d'etre for sāmānādhikaranya vanishes (pp. xi. 415, x. 205, Ved. Saṅg. p. 44). But if sāmānādhikaranya is expressed, there must be some purpose in employing the different words, and hence their special meanings must not be ignored. Of course as the words stand in sāmānādhikaranya they must refer to one and the same thing; i. e. a unity must underlie the differences expressed by the words. Hence the words in a sāmānādhikaranya express different 'modes' of one and the same
substance (x. 205, xi. 411). If the distinctions conveyed by the different words were incapable of being combined in the same thing, we could comprehend no unity between them, so that they cannot be used in sāmānādhi karanya. Thus we cannot say 'a jar is a cloth', because the class-characteristics of a jar and those of a cloth exclude each other. But we can say 'the lotus is blue'; because the class-characteristics of a lotus can iphere in the same substance along with the quality of 'blueness' (p. xi. 414). Hence what sāmānādhi karanya requires is that the terms should express 'modes' of the same substance (x. 258, Ved.Saṅg. p. 44). But if there be no difference of 'modes', there can be no sāmānādhi karanya (xi. 415, x. 205). Hence the sentence 'thou are that' must express and expresses 'modes' of B. (x. 210). Thus the sentence instead of denoting the absolutely non-differentiated unity of B., on the contrary teaches that B. has distinct characteristics (x. 203 f.). Such an explanation of the sentence, R. says, can alone be in agreement with the teachings of the whole section (Ch. Up. vi. 1—8). Here it is taught that B. (called Sat) having formed a resolve of 'becoming many', created light, light created water, and water created food. Then it is explained that everything in the world, including the constituents of man, are made out of these three elements. Then in vi. 8 it is told that 'food' has its source in 'water', 'water' in 'light', and 'light' in 'Sat', i.e. in B. The whole teaching is then summarised in the sentence 'all creatures have their source in Sat, their home in Sat, their support in Sat'. Then comes the conclusion 'all this (i.e. the world) has this (i.e. Sat, or B.) for its soul; that is real; that is the Soul; thou art that, oh Śvetaketu'. R. says, that the great truth which this section wants to teach is, that the world has B. for its soul (p. x. 211) and that of this truth, 'thou art that' is only a special case, an illustration (p. x. 217, p. 349 Ved. Saṅg. p. 32).

1 This way of mentioning that the soul of the world is also the soul of the individual souls is common in the Upaniṣads. Compare e.g. the Antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa, where the soul and controller of the earth etc. is everytime said to be thy soul and controller (also cf. Ch. Up. iii. 4. Br. Up. iii. 4 & 5, Kau. Up. iii. 9 etc.). In this connexion R. points out that in the expression 'thy soul', 'my soul', the words 'thy' and
It is in this way that B. is the cause of the sustenance of the world. B. sustains the world because it is the Soul of the world and apart from it, the world cannot exist. To be dependent on and be controlled by the Supreme Person is the eternal and essential nature of everything (Sū. ii. 4. 14. p. 602). But the world will not remain for ever in its present state, nor has it been so from eternity. In common with all the schools of Indian Philosophy, R. believes in repeated creations and dissolutions of the world. The stream of creation is without beginning (p. 384). At the end of each Kalpa (i.e. a world-period) the world is dissolved, the grosser substances dissolve themselves into subtler ones, till at last ultra-subtle matter, called darkness (tamas) is alone left. This so-called darkness too is related to B. as its body, but is so extremely subtle that it does not deserve to have a separate designation (p. 197) and is as it were non-existing (asatkalpa) (p. 202). When the world is in this state, B. is said to be, as in Ch. Up. vi. 2. 1, 'One only, without a second' (p. 190). But even in this state of non-separation, the souls together with matter, both reduced to extremely subtle condition, exist as body of B. (p. 366) The darkness does not get altogether lost in B. but becomes one with it (ekibhavati) and is no more distinguished by names and forms (p. 191, cf. also Br. Up. i. 4. 7). But only when the world is distinguished by names and forms has it the attribute of existence, and when this distinction vanishes the world has the attribute of non-existence (i.e. the world can be said not to exist) (p. 358).

\[\text{my soul denotes the individual soul and therefore } \text{thy soul and my soul}; \text{ i.e. the soul of the individual soul is B. — a distinction, which, if one bears in mind, will save one to a great extent from misunderstanding the spirit of the Upaniṣads.}\]

1 This belief does not seem to be known to the Brāhmanaś or to the earlier Upaniṣads. Rig Veda vi. 48. 22 seems expressly to deny it; though x. 190. 3. implies it. It is mentioned also in Ath. Veda x. 8. 39 & 40. And several passages in Śvet. Up. show that at its time this belief was commonly accepted.

2 In the Subālā Up. Cf. also Rig Veda x. 129. 3 Śvet. Up. iv. 18 Manu i. 5. According to another passage in the Sub. Up. this state is also called death (p. 199).

3 As remarked on p. 6, existence and non-existence are to be considered only as attributes of a permanent substance.
Thus B., which is "one only, without a second", in so far as it has for its body only extremely subtle matter and souls, which have become one with it and do not deserve a separate designation, forms a resolve to become many and transforms itself into the world in a gross state, distinguished by names and forms (p. 201). In all conditions B. has souls and matter for its "body". When they are in a subtle condition, B. is "cause", and when they are in a gross condition the same B. is effect and called the world (p. 366). Thus the effect, viz. the world, is non-different from the cause, viz. B. (p. 349). When there is no distinction of "names and forms", B. is "one" and "cause"; and when there is, it is many and effect (p. 190). When B. is in causal state, the world is in the state of dissolution (Natura naturans), when B. is in effected state, the world is in the state of creation (Natura naturata) (Ved. Saṅg. p. 115).

It is in this sense that we have to understand that B. is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Not only matter and souls are body of B., and hence incapable of existing independently of it, but before creation they exist in so subtle a condition that they may be said to be non-existing. Then at creation B. who is "one without a second", transforms itself into this wonderful world of matter and souls (p. 202).

In the Śāstras this relation of B. to world is compared to that of threads to cloth (n. 1. 19) and to that of wind to the five prāyas (n. 1. 20). Further to show that B. transforms itself into the world without using any instruments, the creation is compared to the turning of milk into curd (Śū. n. 1. 24). To the objection, that B. being without parts (niravaya) and without instruments, we cannot conceive how it could create the world, R. answers that the scriptures tell us that B. possesses all wonderful powers and therefore it is not impossible for it to do so (Śū. n. 1. 27 & 31).

But though B. has thus a causal state and an effected state, we have not to understand that B. undergoes changes like clay or

1 In this state the world exists only potentially (jākṣimatṛa-vaśeṣam) p. 19.
2 See below p. 63.
gold, i.e., the world is not made of B., just as pots are made of clay or ornaments are made of gold (p. 300). In its causal state B. has for its body the world in an extremely subtle condition; but when the time of creation comes, B. transforms it into the world in a gross state, when matter undergoes various essential changes and the souls too undergo a kind of change;¹ but B. remains always the same, all changes being precluded from its nature. But all the same B. assumes a different state, because while it had first the world in its subtle state for its 'body', now it has the world in its gross state for its body. Thus the change, which consists merely in the assumption of a state different from the causal one, is common to B. and souls and matter (p. 530 & 531). And we have seen that a cause in a different state is its effect. Hence B. can pass from its causal state into an effected state without at the same time undergoing any changes in itself (Gītā 212). 'The Supreme Soul is in an effected state (kāryatva) in that sense only that it controls and hence is the soul of matter and souls in their gross state; but just for this reason, viz. that He is their controller and soul, He is not touched by the weakness (apurusārtha) of the souls and the transmutations of matter. In possession of unlimited knowledge and bliss etc. He for ever abides in His uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making the world go round (p. 203). 'Because the imperfections adhering to the body do not touch the soul and the qualities of the soul do not extend to the body. For instance in the case of embodied beings (celestial beings, men etc.), childhood, youth, old age belong to the body and not to the soul, and knowledge, pleasure etc. belong to the soul and not to the body (p. 283). 'Just as in a particoloured cloth made of a mass of white, black and red threads, whiteness etc. is seen only in those parts where those particular threads are; and hence in the effected state (i.e. in the cloth) there is no intermingling (of the natures of threads), just as there was none in the causal state (i.e. in the mass of threads); similarly though the world is

¹ See below p. 47.
made of the aggregation of souls, matter, and the Lord, still in its effected state there is no intermingling of their respective characteristics, viz. being a sufferer (souls), being the object of suffering (matter), being the controller (Lord). But there is this difference: the threads are capable of existing separately and therefore they have causal and effected states only when they are incidentally brought together by the will of some person. But individual souls and matter are in all their conditions the "body" of the Supreme Person and possess reality only as His "modes"; therefore the Supreme Person Himself is both cause and effect; all words always denote Him alone. But as far as differences of nature and the absence of their intermingling is concerned, there is similarity (Gita, pp. 211—212).

Thus by understanding the chief teaching of the Upaniṣads, that B. is the soul of the entire world, to mean that the world has existence only as 'mode' of B., R. can say that there exists B. alone, and at the same time say that the world of plurality exists as well; he can say that the world and the individual souls are B., and at the same time affirm that the world and souls are different from it; further he can say that B. is both the material and the efficient cause of the world, and accepting the text of the Satkāryavāda say that the cause viz. B. is now different from the effect, viz. the world, and at the same time assert that B. is eternally in possession of unlimited knowledge, bliss etc., while suffering and transmutations are the lot of the souls and matter. In this way he can accept and harmonize the whole mass of seemingly contradicting Upaniṣad-texts without calling the greater part of them 'aparā vidyā' (lower knowledge) (p. 366, Ved. Saṃg. pp. 131—34).

The next principle Upaniṣad-text that comes in consideration in ascertaining the nature of B. is Tait. Up. i. 1. 'Existence, knowledge, infinite is B.' This text describes that nature of B., which

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1 Hence R.'s system is known by the name of Viśiṣṭādvaita, i. e. modified monism.
distinguishes it from everything else. Here the term "existence" expresses that B. has unconditioned existence, and so distinguishes it from matter and souls still implicated in matter; because as both undergo changes of states called by different names, they have no unconditioned existence. The term "knowledge" expresses the eternally non-contracted and uniform knowledge of B.; and so distinguishes it from the souls that have attained final release, because their knowledge was at one time contracted. Lastly the term "infinite" expresses that B. is not limited by time, space or other things, and as B. possesses qualities, the infinity belongs to its qualities as well as to its essential nature (svarūpa). This distinguishes B. from the souls called "nityas" (eternals), because their essential nature as well as their qualities are limited (p. x. 365).

The chief thing to be noted in connexion with this text is that according to R. 'Existence etc.' are attributes of B. and do not form its essence; in other words B. has existence etc. and not, as the non-dualists would say, B. is existence etc. 'It cannot be said that B. is "mere existence" (sanmātra), because existence is one element (aṃśa) of B., and this existence is besides "distinguished" (saviśeṣa)' (p. 353). 'We say "a jar exists, a cloth exists" and thus we know that existence is a predicate of substances, and therefore it cannot itself be a substance or a cause' (p. 354). 'The same thing holds good of "knowledge" as of "existence"; "knowledge or consciousness" (anubhūti, jñāna, avagati, samvid) is an attribute of a knowing subject and related to an object' (p. viii. 641, p. 440). 'We cannot possibly conceive of "knowledge" that is without a substrate (i.e. subject) or without an object' (ix. 48). 'Just as when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut, the act of cutting cannot take place, so in the absence of connexion with "I" or "ego" no knowledge

1 R. does not refer to these 'nityas' again. It seems from the commentary that they mean souls who were never implicated in the state of transmigration (samsāra), and consequently they had neither to undergo any changes nor was their knowledge ever contracted. But being only individual souls they are both in size and powers limited (i.e. they are minute [aṇu] and do not possess powers of shaping the world etc.).
can exist" (ix. 52). A knowing subject has "knowledge" for his essential nature and knowledge can inhere only in a knowing subject. Therefore the Upanishad texts, like the one in question, which declare that "B. is knowledge," only mean that knowledge is the essential nature of B. and not that "pure knowledge" is the only reality" (p. ix. 314, x. 304). Besides the Upaniṣads say in several places that B. is a knower: see Mu. Up. i. 1. 9, Śvet. Up. vi. 8. 11, Br. Up. ii. 4. 14, and all the places where, as in the accounts of creation, it is said ,B. thought" (p. ix. 314). Here it should be noted that ,the "knowledge" of B. is immediate, i. e. not dependent on the organs of sense, because omniscience is its nature. It has direct intuition (sākṣāt-kāra) of colour etc. and not a visual perception of colour.1 Cf. Śvet. Up. iii. 19 (p. xiii. 87 and 122). Further the knowledge of B. is always of the agreeable kind and therefore is of the nature of bliss. Hence in the case of B. knowledge and bliss mean one and the same thing. For this reason B. is also called "bliss" (Tait. Up. iii. 6, Br. Up. iii. 9. 28), which means, not that B. is bliss, but that it has bliss for its essential nature2 (p. ix. 370).

Then when it is said that B. is infinite, i. e. not limited by time, space or other things,3 we have not to understand, as the commentary remarks (p. x. 402), that B. is spaceless and timeless and that nothing besides it exists, but it means that it is omnipresent and eternal, and that nothing exists independent of it. For Upaniṣads teach that B. is all-pervading, cf. Śvet. Up. iii. 9, Mu. Up. i. 1. 6 etc.4 (p. 707). And when B. is said to be of minute size (e. g. Ch. Up. iii. 14. 3) or when it is said to reside in the heart of man (e. g. Br. Up. iv. 4. 22) or when it is said to be of the size of a thumb5 (e. g. Ka. Up. iv. 12, vi. 17), it is intended only to enjoin meditation on B. in this form (pp. xii. 580, xiii. 568, xiii. 637).

Everywhere in Śruti and Smṛti B. is taught to possess twofold attributes (ubhayaliṅga) viz. 1) total absence of any evils and 2) being

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1 Hence as B. has knowledge, it is not without the sense of 'I' (p. ix. 209).
2 See last page.
3 Because man's heart is said to be of the size of a thumb (p. xiii. 638).
endowed with all the auspicious qualities (p. 672). Only these two classes of attributes together can express the distinctive nature of B. Because the individual souls too possess the (auspicious) qualities of bliss etc.; but in their case these qualities are capable of being joined to evils, but B. is by its very nature opposed to all evils. Hence the possession of the auspicious qualities by B. must be thought of as characterised by the absence of all evils (p. 783 f.). The text which R. chiefly refers to as illustrating at once both these classes of B.'s qualities is Ch. Up. vii. 1. 5 'This Soul (i.e. B.) is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger, free from thirst, whose wishes are realised, whose purposes are realised'. 'Here the first part of the text denies of B. qualities that are evil, and the last two terms assert those that are auspicious. Similarly in other places only those qualities are denied of B. which are evil. Cf. Br. Up. iii. 8. 8, Mu. i. 1. 6, etc.' (p. ix 303). 'The qualities are evil because they belong to the world formed of the individual souls and matter' (p. 784, cf. p. ix 314), i.e. they belong either to matter or to souls that are implicated in matter. Compare for instance Br. Up. iii. 8. 8 'The wise call it (i.e. B.) the Imperishable (akṣara). It is not large, not small, not short, not long, not red, not oily, not shadowy, not dark, not made of air, not of sky, not sticky, without taste, without smell, without eye, without ear, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without pleasure, without mouth, without measure, without inside, without outside; it eats nothing'. After denying thus of B. qualities which matter gives rise to (prākṛta),¹ the text continues 'By the control of this Imperishable, sun and moon are held apart (i.e. follow their respective courses), by its control the earth and sky are held apart, by its control minutes, hours, days, nights, half-months, months, seasons, years are held apart, by its control the rivers flow from the snowy mountains to the east, to the west and in other directions'. Thus 'the texts which say that B. is without (certain) qualities (nirguna) deny

¹ p. ix 314.
of it only the undesirable qualities, and the texts which assert that B. possesses (certain) qualities (saguna) attribute to it only the auspicious qualities. Hence there is no contradiction between the two kinds of texts and there is not the least reason to assume that the subject of one of them is unreal (ix 317 f.). In this sense we have to understand another celebrated text from the Upanishads: *neti, neti* (not so, not so) (Br. Up. m. 9. 26; iv. 2. 4, 4. 22, 5. 15). 'The *so* in *not so* refers to the attributes of the world, known without the help of the Scriptures (i.e. in ordinary ways), and therefore *not so* expresses that the nature of B. is not like that of the world. This interpretation is confirmed by the words which immediately follow; for they deny only such attributes of B. as belong to the world (p. 803 f.). Similarly *not so, not so* which occurs again in another connection in Br. Up. m. 3. 6, the *so* refers to the two forms of B. described in that chapter and *not so* denies that B. is limited to them alone. This interpretation is confirmed by what follows: *It is *not so* because there is nothing greater than it. Its name is *Reality of realities*, the individual souls are realities, but it is their Reality.* Thus *not so* does not deny all attributes of B. The chapter expressly teaches several attributes of B., which could not otherwise be learnt, and if thereupon the *not so, not so* were to deny them all, it will be *like the talking of a mad man* (Su. m. 2. 21, p. 682 f.).

'The only way to attain to deathlessness (amrtatva) is the knowledge of the Supreme Person (p. 156). But as B. cannot be known by any ordinary means of knowledge, only the Scriptures can reveal it to us (p. x 431). But the Scriptures again and again insist on declaring the glorious qualities of B. and thus show that they lay special stress on them. And the Scriptures, which are thousand times more loving than one's own parents, are not, like a cheat, capable of teaching, with particular insistence, qualities — not otherwise to be known — which have no real existence and hence are to be disregarded, and thus still more perplex men, who are already wearied

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1 For what R. understands here by 'knowledge' see below.
by the cycle of transmigration and are anxious for release (p. 803). For these reasons B. is to be apprehended as possessing infinite number of auspicious qualities and hence it must be considered to be characterised in two ways (i.e. as free from all evils and endowed with all blessings) (Śū. Ṣr. 2.25, p. 686). Nor is this possession by B. of infinite auspicious qualities — knowledge, bliss etc. — to be regarded as adventitious; it is essential and hence eternal (p. 353). The qualities of the infinite B. are also infinite, and therefore neither speech nor mind can grasp their extent (Tait. Up. ii. 4). Hence those who believe that they know the limits of B., do not know B. (Ke. Up. ii. 3), because B. is without limits (p. ix 367).

I shall conclude this section by quoting the brief description of B., which R. gives in the beginning of the fourth Pāda of the first chapter: — ,B. is the object of that knowledge, which alone leads to the highest good, viz. the final release; it is the cause of the origination etc. of the world; it is different in nature from matter and from souls, whether bound or released, totally opposed to all evils, all-knowing, all-powerful, capable of achieving all its purposes, possessing every kind of auspicious quality, the inward Soul of all, possessing unrivalled glory (p. 71).

2. Brahman as the Soul of the individual souls.

Some Upaniṣad-texts declare that the souls are different from B. and others declare that the two are non-different. In order that both these classes of texts may be true in their primary (literal) sense, the individual soul must be admitted to be a part (aṁśa) of B. (p. 571); cf. Gītā xv. 7, Ch. Up. iii. 12. 6. But by 'part' we have not here to understand a part cut off from the whole (khaṇḍa). Because B. is indivisible and secondly B. being different in nature from the individual soul, the latter cannot be a part of the former in this sense. The individual soul is a part of B. in the sense in

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1 i.e. through Māyā or Upādhis.
2 vide supra p. 42f.
which the brightness of a luminous body is a part of that body; or in the sense in which the generic characteristics of cow or horse are parts of a cow or a horse; or whiteness or blackness are parts of white or black things, or in the sense in which a body is a part of a celestial being, man or other embodied beings. For a part means any portion of a thing (ekavastvekadesa); and hence a distinguishing attribute is a part of a thing distinguished by it. Hence in a distinguished thing we can discriminate between the distinguishing part and the distinguished part. Therefore although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished are related to each other as part and whole, they are essentially different from each other. In the same way although individual soul and B. are related to each other as a distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished and hence as part and whole, they can still be essentially different. ... Hence all mention (in the Upaniṣads) of difference between B. and soul refers to the essential difference between B. as the object distinguished and the soul as a distinguishing attribute. But the mention of unity between the two is equally valid, because a distinguishing attribute cannot exist apart from, and is bound to the thing distinguished (Śū. ii. 3. 45, p. 574 sq.). Thus we see that by saying that individual soul is a part of B., R. means exactly the same thing as when he says that B. is the Soul and the individual soul the Body. The latter is only a 'mode' of the former.

As B. is the Soul of individual souls, B. exists together with them in the different bodies. But this connexion with a body brings suffering to the individual soul, because he is subject to karman and must suffer what it brings to his lot; but B. being subject to nothing, the same connexion not only leaves it free from any evils, but on the contrary adds to its glory by manifesting its controlling and governing power. Cf. Mu. Up. iii. 1. 1 (end of Śū. iii. 2. 12 and beginning of iii. 2. 13, p. 674).

In the state of dissolution of the world the individual souls abide as „body“ of B. in an extremely subtle condition, devoid of „name and form“ and thus incapable of being designated as some-
thing different from B.⁴ (p. 384). Then at the time of creation, the souls undergo a change which consists in the expansion of their power of knowledge, so as to make them fit to suffer the fruits of their past karman⁵ (p. 531). In this sense, the souls are an effect of B.⁴ (p. 142). Thus the souls have an effected state (kāryatvo), inasmuch as they undergo a change of state; but this change consists only in the expansion of their power of knowledge. There is no change in their essential nature⁶ (p. 530).

Changes as that of clay into a pot are denied in the case of souls⁶ (p. xi 586). Then they are joined to different bodies, celestial, human etc. in accordance with their karman. Thus the inequalities in the world being due to the karman of the souls, B. is not exposed to the charge of cruelty⁸ (p. 383). In these bodies, all the activities of the souls — from thinking to winking of an eye — are subject to their karman⁹ (p. xi 360).

But this karman is not to be considered as something independent of B., so that it could, as the Sāmkhyas says, act of itself on matter⁶ and so modify it that its products might correspond to the deserts of the individual souls (p. 399). On the contrary the nature of karman is to be understood as follows: — Our good and evil karman pleases or displeases the Supreme Person, and their fruits, viz. future pleasure or pain, depend on the favour or disfavour of the Lord⁶ (p. 400). It is only He — all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous — who being pleased with our sacrifices, charities, offerings etc., as well as with our worship, has the power to reward us with enjoyment here or in the other world, as well as with final release. karman on the other hand, which is unconscious and transitory, is incapable of producing its fruit at a future time¹⁰ (p. 710). The Lord having prescribed that certain works are proper and others improper, supplies all the individual souls with bodies,

¹ R. rejects the existence of apūrva or adṛtya — the supposed invisible product of an act which possesses the power to produce in due time the proper fruit of the act — by calling it mere fancy (parikalpana) unauthorised by scriptures (aśruta) p. 712 and p. 5.
sense-organs etc., needed to perform their works, and with power to employ them; reveals to them Scriptures teaching the rules of proper conduct; and Himself enters within them as their inward Soul and abides there to control and to "assent"1 (p. 401).

Thus, the individual souls depend entirely on B. for their activity2 (p. 563). 'The power which the souls exercise over their sense-organs is dependent on the will of B.' (p. 602). 'B. is the intestinal fire that digests the eaten food'3 (p. xii 246, Gītā xv. 14). 'Brahman is the power with which all breathing creatures breathe their breath' (p. 792). 'It is the source of all joy on the part of the individual souls' (p. xi 586). 'Husband, wife, son etc. are dear to us, not because of our will nor of their will, but because of the will of B.'2 'The activities of the objects of senses, of the senses themselves, of mind, of intellect, of the soul and of the body are all dependent on the will of B.' (p. 75 sq.). 'Memory and perception, as well as their loss, are worked by B.' (Gītā xv. 15). 'It is by the will of the Supreme Person that an individual soul is either in the state of bondage or of release. He hides the true, essentially blessed nature of the soul who has committed sins in his beginningless chain of karman' (p. 657). 'It is He, who as the Inner Soul, brings about even the spiritual worship (by means of which an individual soul can attain release). Thus B. is not only the object to be attained by worship, but is also the means of performing the worship itself' (p. 78).

But this immanence of B. in the souls is not to be so construed as to leave no room for freedom of action on their part. 'The souls resting in B., and furnished by it with bodies and sense-organs as well as with powers to use them, apply themselves of their own accord and in accordance with their own wishes, to works either good or evil' (p. 402). 'No action indeed is possible without

1 For the meaning of 'assent' see next page.
2 This is the interpretation which R. puts on Br. Up. iv. 5. 6 (p. 159 sq.)
3 The hiding of the soul's true nature takes place by its connexion with a body in the 'creation-state' of the world, and with subtle matter in its 'dissolution-state' (p. 657).
the assent (anumati) of the Inner Soul; but in all actions there is
the volitional effort (prayatna) made by the individual soul; and
the Supreme Soul, by giving His assent to it, carries out the action.1
For this reason the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions with regard
to conduct are not devoid of meaning2 (Śū. u. 3. 41, p. 563, Ved.
Saṅg. p. 140). ,And also for the same reason the Lord cannot be
charged with arbitrariness for rewarding those who obey His com-
mands and punishing those who transgress them. Nor can He be
accused of being merciless. Because mercy shown to persons who
are given to transgressing the right rules of conduct, does no good;
on the contrary it produces weakness (apurūṇstva). To chastise them
is in this case the right thing. For otherwise to punish one’s enemies
would be a blamable act. By chastising the transgressors and by
not tolerating the infinite and unbearable sins gathered during the
endless ages, God Himself helps to increase happiness to the highest
degree3 (p. 402.)

Just as individual souls are not without freedom to please or
displease the Supreme Person by their acts, so He too in His deal-
ings with them is not entirely bound by their karman. He can show
special favour or disfavour to them. ,When one is fully earnest in
his resolve to please God, God of His own accord engenders in his
mind love for virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to Him;
on the other hand, when one obstinately insists on displeasing God
by his acts; in order to punish him God engenders in him love for
actions that degrade him and oppose his attainment of Him4 (p. 564,
19. When an individual soul attains to perfect realisation of B., it
gives highest pleasure to B., who, as we shall see in another chapter,
destroyes all the effects of his entire karman; and frees him com-
pletely from the round of transmigration (p. 930 sq.).

I shall conclude this section also by quoting a passage (p. 572)
in which R. expresses the relation of soul to God : — ,The soul is

1 The individual soul only wills the action, but the power that carries it
out is B.’s.
created by B., is controlled by it, is its body, is subservient to it, is supported by it, is reduced to the 'subtle' condition by it (viz. in the 'dissolution-state' of the world), is a worshipper of it, and depends on its grace for its welfare.

3. Brahman as the Soul of the material world.

Matter or Prakṛti is thus characterised (p. 112): — Matter is the substance out of which the whole world is made, which is the means for the experience of pleasure and pain and for the final release\(^1\) of the individual souls who are implicated in it from eternity, and which is without consciousness.

Some passages in the Upaniṣads teach that the world is the same as B., whereas there are others which teach that it is different from B. In order that both these teachings may be equally true, three explanations are suggested of the nature of the relation between the world and B. Firstly, the difference between B. and the world is like the difference between a snake coiled up and the same snake lying at length, i.e. the difference lies only in the position or form sanāthāna (Sū. i. 2. 26, p. 688). Secondly, the relation between the world and B. is like that between light and a luminous body; i.e. the oneness between the two is only in so far as the class-characteristics are concerned (Sū. i. 2. 27). Both these explanations R. rejects as unsatisfactory, declaring himself in favour of the third, according to which the material world is related to B. in the same way as the individual souls are, viz. as part to whole, in the sense that the world is a distinguishing attribute (vibeṣaṇa) and B. the object distinguished (viśiṣṭa). B. and world are one, because an attribute cannot exist independently of the thing distinguished by it; but as an attribute is essentially different from the thing it distinguishes, so is the world essentially different from B. (Sū. i. 2. 28).

But matter is even more completely dependent on B. than the souls. Because, as said above, the souls can will an action, though

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\(^1\) Because the souls are in need of bodies in order to do the work that would ultimately lead to their final release (p. 76).
they require the 'assent' of B. to carry it out. Further, the past actions (karman) of the souls regulate the formation of the world (p. 142). But matter, being unconscious, has no power of its own. Only with B. for its Soul can matter do its work. Otherwise it can have neither different natures, nor different states, nor different activities (p. 85). For instance the change of water into ice or of milk into curd cannot take place if B. were not controlling it (Sū. n. 2. 2, p. 398). The change of grass eaten by a cow into milk takes place only because B. brings it about and not of its own power; for the change does not take place when grass is eaten by a bull (Sū. n. 2. 4, p. 404).

As explained above (p. 37) even in the 'dissolution' state of the world (pralaya) matter does not get lost, but remains in an extremely subtle form as the body of B., without the distinction of 'name and form', and is known by the name of Tamas (darkness) (p. 191). Matter in this 'causal' condition is uncreated, ajā, as in Śvet. Up. i. 9, rv. 5 and in Gītā xiii. 19 (p. 109). This 'causal' matter is not however the same as Śaṅkhya Prakṛti. Because it is, so to say, one with B. (Brahmatāpamā), and the three Guṇas are not as yet evolved in it. Only when the time of the creation of the world comes, the Guṇas arise in it; hence what according to the Śaṅkhya is the original Prakṛti, is according to R., something effected (kārya) (pp. 109 & 190). This Prakṛti having three Guṇas has a beginning and is 'created', just as all its transmutations are.

Individual souls and material things both have effected conditions (kāryatva) in so far as they assume a condition, different from what they had in the 'dissolution-state' of the world. But the material things have an origin (utpatti), whereas it (the origin) is denied of the souls. Because the change that takes place in the case of the souls when they pass from the 'subtle' to the 'gross' state consists only in the expansion of their power of knowledge, which was contracted. But the material things, such as sky etc., undergo a change of their essential nature (svanūpā-nyathābhava). And a change of the essential nature is what is meant by origin (utpatti) (p. 530).
Another reason why the material things must be considered to have an origin is that they are made up of parts (sāvayava); and what is made up of parts cannot be eternal (several places in Sū. i. 1. 3).

The order in which, at the time of creation, the 'ultra-subtle' matter, called 'Darkness' (tamas), gradually transforms itself into grosser bodies is, according to R., the one taught by the Subālā Upaniṣad (p. 517). It is as follows: — 'Darkness' (tamas) — the 'Imperishable' (aṅkṣara) — the 'Unevolved' (avyakta = the Prakṛti of the Śāṅkhya) — the 'Great' (mahat) — the 'first element' (Bhūtādī, i. e. the ahamkāra of the Śāṅkhya) — the 'subtle elements' (tanmātras) — the substance out of which the sense-organs are made (indriyāṇi) — Space2 (ākāśa) — Wind (vāyu) — Fire — Water — Earth.

1 The Subālā Up. states the order in which the world, at the end of one of its periods, gradually dissolves itself and finally becomes one with B. (p. 200). But R. remarks the order of creation must be the reverse of this (p. 198).

2 Ākāśa (space) is thus strangely considered to be a product of the transformations of matter. The following is probably the explanation of this queer idea: —

Ākāśa primarily means, as 'Petersburger Wörterbuch' rightly observes, 'empty space' ('freier Raum'); it denotes either empty space in general, i. e. all-pervading as in Br. Up. iii. 8. 4; or as is in an uncritical way more commonly understood, the empty space that extends in all directions above the surface of the earth. In this sense the word ākāśa is understood in common language and in this sense it was used in the older Upaniṣads.

The account of creation given in Ch. Up. vi. 2f., which obviously depends on Br. Up. i. 2, gives only three elements as constituting the entire world, viz. Light (= fire), Water, and Food (= earth). From earlier times 'Air' or 'Wind' (Vāyu) had, on account of its power of sustaining life and on account of its ceaseless activity (cf. Br. Up. i. 5. 21—22), gained importance in Indian speculation. Cf. Br. Up. iii. 7. 2 'Air is the thread in which this world and the other world, and all creatures are strung together'. Hence it naturally came to be considered as an original element of the world along with the other three and gained precedence over them. Then in Ch. Up. vii ākāśa is mentioned along with the three elements of Ch. Up. vi. 2: — 'Water is greater than food' (vii. 10), 'light is greater than water' (vii. 11) and ākāśa is greater than light' (vii. 12). Probably this is the first authority for counting ākāśa along with the other elements. And passages like Br. Up. iii. 8. 7—8, iii. 7. 12, Ch. Up. vii. 26. 1 could easily suggest that it was created by B. So we have in Tait. Up. ii. 1 'From this ātman (i. e. B.) arose
Such an account of the creation of the world is much later than any found in the earlier Upaniṣads. Instead of this long series of the Subalā Upaniṣad, the Chāndogya has only three elements and ākāśa; from ākāśa wind; from wind fire; from fire water; from water earth. The order here given has ever since remained authoritative for almost all systems of Indian philosophy. In this way ākāśa began to be counted along with the four elements. Cf. Śvet. Up. ii. 12, vi. 2, Pr. Up. vi. 4, Muṇḍ. Up. ii. 1. 3. But in all these places ākāśa means 'space', as is seen from the fact that the word used in its place is 'Kha', literally 'an opening', 'a hole'. In Āit. Up. iii. 3 , earth, wind, ākāśa, water, and fire are for the first time called pañca mahabhūtani i.e. five great created things. But this does not imply that they were all alike considered to be of material nature. On the other hand we have reasons to believe that ākāśa was not, even in philosophical circles, considered material like the other four. Thus we see for instance, that later the Jainas comprise all the material elements under the name Pudgala; but they do no include ākāśa under it, which they consider to be a separate 'substance' (dravya), infinite in extension and having the function of 'giving space'. (Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra v. 1—18. Translated by Prof. Jacobi in Z. D. M. G. vol. 60.) The materialistic school of the Cārvākas, according to the account given of them in the Sarvadarśanasaṅgṛaha, teaches : 'In this world there are four elements, earth, water, fire, wind. Consciousness arises out of these four'. The Buddhists, even of the school which does not deny reality to the external world, understand ākāśa in a negative sense, as the absence of other things (āva- raṇābhāva).

In the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy ākāśa denotes a 'substance' (dravya) having sound as its quality; and a special word, diś, is used to denote a 'substance' which enables us to localise. The word diś, in general usage as well as in the Upaniṣads, means cardinal points. The source of the idea of attributing sound as quality to ākāśa very probably lies in the efforts towards schematising in philosophy. The four elements wind, fire, water, earth were considered to be the substrates of touch, colour, taste and smell respectively, which form the objects of four of our senses; and a fifth substance was wanted to form the substrate of sound; and ākāśa was made to take its place; because it was generally counted along with the four elements; and probably because Ch.Up. vii. 12.1 contained a similar idea. But even in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, was ākāśa considered to be a material element like the other four? There are several considerations which show that it was not. As is well-known, these two schools are atomistic. But whereas wind, fire, water, and earth are constituted of atoms, ākāśa is not. Just like 'space' (diś) it is all-pervading, eternal (i.e. not created), and one whole (ekā); it is not made up of parts (niravaya). Whereas the four elements enter into combination with each other, ākāśa does not. Motion (kriyā) inheres in the four elements, but not in ākāśa. From all this it seems very probable that ākāśa was supposed to possess the same nature as diś, the difference between the two lying in their functions;
the Taittirīya has five. R. sees no contradiction between these various accounts; for he thinks that the circumstance that some of the

that of the ākūśa being to be the substrate of sound; and that of the dīś being to be the means for localising. But these two functions being too heterogeneous to belong to the same substance, ākūśa and dīś were considered to be two different substances. That even in these systems ākūśa continues to possess its old and common meaning is seen from the fact that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika writers use kha, gagana, vyoman etc. as its synonyms.

In the laborious scheme of the Sāṁkhya philosophy ākūśa is for the first time said in an outspoken way to be a product of the transmutations of matter. It is the consequence of two circumstances; firstly, the traditional way of counting ākūśa along with the four elements; and secondly, the correspondence, introduced between our five senses and the five substances. But this idea did not remain confined to the Sāṁkhya. The Sāṁkhya scheme of the constitution and evolution of the world was more or less adopted in the later works on Vedānta; and consequently here too ākūśa becomes a product of matter and enters into combination with the other elements, as the scheme of pañcākaraṇa shows. But strange as it may appear, all these writers understand ākūśa in its usual sense of 'space'. In Tattva-samāsa, an important work on Sāṁkhya (translated by Max Müller in his 'Six Systems'), ākūśa is said to come into existence like the other four elements by the transformations of matter and to possess sound for its quality, but its function is said to be 'to give space to the other four elements'.

Śaṅkara uses ākūśa in its usual sense of space. But he says that we know of its existence, because we must assume some substrate for sound (Br. Śū. ii. 2. 24). And following Tait. Up. ii. 1 he maintains that it is created and not eternal (Śū. ii. 3. 7). According to R. we can know that ākūśa exists, because it enables us to localise the flights of birds etc.; so that we can say 'a hawk flies here, a vulture flies there' (p. 434). He too uses the word in the sense of space, though according to the scheme of creation given above, he believes it to be a product of matter. Further he admits that ākūśa is not made up of parts (niravayava); but he says 'we must hold it to be created, because the Scripture tells us so' (p. 505).

From all this it will be seen that in Indian philosophy there are properly speaking only four material elements; and that its ākūśa has nothing in common with the 'ether' of the Greeks. And hence the common notion that India and Greece both have the same five elements is not accurate. As long ago as 1875 Prof. Jacobi had pointed out (Z. D. M. G. vol. xxix, p. 244) the mistake of translating ākūśa with 'ether'. But the force of tradition seems to be as strong among the modern interpreters of Indian philosophy as it was on the philosophy itself.

Before leaving this subject it will be interesting to note that R. does not consider 'time' to be a separate substance like 'space'; but only an attribute of substances (padarthavīteṣaṇa) (p. 452).
elements are not mentioned in a text does not imply that the text denies them (cf. Sū. ii. 3. 6, p. 506).

A point in this connexion on which R. lays special stress is, that we have not to understand this order of creation to mean that the different elements in it are produced, as the Sāmkhya would say, by the elements proceeding them. It is B. having these elements for its body, who produces the elements that follow (Sū. ii. 3.14, p.514). For this reason it is not wrong if the account of creation is begun, as in Ch. Up., by saying that B. created fire, or, as in Tait. Up., by saying that B. created sky; or if, as in Mu. Up. p. 1. 3, the things created by B. are stated promiscuously instead of following the true order; because in reality each and every element in the series is created directly by B. (Sū. ii. 3.15 & 16, p. 515).

After all these elements are created, they constitute what is called 'the world in aggregate' (samaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi p. 606), i.e. each of the elements is isolated from the other and exists in an undivided totality. In order to produce from this 'world in aggregate', the world of individual bodies (vyāṣṭi-sṛṣṭi) with the distinctions of names and forms, it is considered necessary that all the elements are mixed up (p.613). The origin of this idea lies in Ch. Up. vi. 3. But there the number of elements is only three; and hence the act of mixing them up is called 'making tripartite' (trīvrthakāraṇa). R. makes use of the same word, but as is seen from the smṛti text which he quotes (p.614), he understands by it the mixing up, not only of the three elements in Ch. Up., but of all the elements enumerated above. He does not confine this 'mixing up', as the Sāmkhya and the later works on Vedānta do, to the change of the 'subtle elements' into gross ones; nor does he give any detailed scheme, like that of the Sāmkhya or the one known by the name of pañcikāraṇa. But this much we learn from him that the elements are mixed up in such a way that, instead of all the things in the world being made up of all the elements in equal quantities, there is in them always a preponderance of some one of the elements. Thus what we call water
has a preponderance of the element 'water' in it, though it contains all the other elements in smaller proportions (p. 615).

These elements, when mixed up, form what is called a 'cosmic egg' (anda). In this 'egg' is born Hiranyakagarbha,¹ also called Pra-jäpati or Brahmä. He has four faces and is considered the highest among the 'celestial beings' (p. 609). He is also called creator (dhätr), because he is entrusted with the work of making the various kinds of individual bodies out of the 'world in aggregate' (samaşti-srśti). So far the 'subtler elements' of which the sense-organs are made, and the 'gross elements' of which the gross bodies are made, are not divided into separate sets of sense-organs and bodies. So that the individual souls are as yet without bodies. They are collectively represented by Hiranyagarbha, who has the whole 'cosmic egg' for his body. For this reason he is called a 'collective individual-soul' (samaşti-jiva).

Hiranyagarbha then creates the world as we see it, having the distinctions of 'name and form'. But here R. wants us to note that in reality this work is done, not by Hiranyakagarbha, but by B. having Hiranyakagarbha for its body (p. 610). This is, R. thinks, the meaning of Ch. Up. vi. 3. 2. B. having taken the 'collective soul' i. e. Hiranyakagarbha for its 'attribute' (višeśaṇa) i. e. as its 'body', enters the world and distinguishes it by 'names and forms', i. e. produces celestial and other kinds of embodied souls (p. 610).

The world which is thus produced, is always of the same form as it had before the previous dissolution (p. 202). At the beginning of each creation B. recollects² the arrangement of the world as it existed before, and creates accordingly (p. 201). When B. has created the 'cosmic egg' and Hiranyakagarbha in it, it manifests the Vedas

¹ Hiranyakagarbha is just an individual soul like any other; but his acts in his previous lives were of an extraordinary merit; and as a reward, he is appointed to his high office for one world-period.

² This is the interpretation, which R. puts on स तपोऽत्यतं, 'He practised penance'. Tait. Up. ii. 6 etc. Cf. Mu. Up. i. 1. 9 यस्य चानस्मय तपः | , whose penance consists in knowledge (p. 201).
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

in exactly the same arrangement and succession (of words, chapters etc.), which they had in the previous world-period,\(^1\) teaches them to Hiranyagarbha and appoints him to create the world of individual bodies. Cf. Śvet. Up. vi. 18 (p. 19). The characteristics of the bodies of various beings like Indra and so forth, present themselves to the mind of Hiranyagarbha through the words of the Vedas, which he has learnt, and thereupon he creates them\(^2\) (p. 18).

\(^1\) This is what we have to understand, R. thinks, when the Vedas are said to be eternal (nītya) and ‘independent of any person’ (apauruṣeyā). This word is generally translated by ‘of superhuman origin’. But what is eternal can have no origin, whether human or superhuman. These attributes do not imply that the words of the Vedas exist eternally; because ‘words (śabdas) are products of the “first element” (bhūtādi); and therefore they cannot exist in the state of complete dissolution of matter’ (p. 18). The Vedas are independent of any person (apauruṣeyā) and eternal, because they are always recited in exactly the same order in which they existed before, by committing them to memory\(^4\) (p. 20, Ved. Saṃg. p. 243). The order of the Vedas is independent even of B.; just as it is of us; the only difference being that B. has not to depend on memory for the knowledge of the Vedas; it comes to it spontaneously\(^4\) (p. 21).

Besides the kind of complete dissolution of the world, which is called prākritika pralaya (Dissolution of the original matter) and which is always meant wherever ‘dissolution’ is spoken of in this dissertation, there is believed to take place another kind of dissolution called naimitika pralaya (occasional dissolution), when only the ‘world of individual bodies’ is dissolved, but the ‘cosmic egg’ and Hiranyagarbha persist. In this case the Vedas exist in the memory of Hiranyagarbha (p. 18).

But Hiranyagarbha does not hand down the knowledge of the Vedas by teaching them to others. Because according to the tradition, the ‘original seers’ (ṛṣis) for the first time directly see the Vedas, and do not learn them from others. At the beginning of each creation, Hiranyagarbha endows certain individual souls with the bodies and powers of Vasiṣṭha and other Seers (ṛṣis) and thereupon these ṛṣis practise certain penances and then are able to see the Vedas, having exactly the same accents and letters, as those seen by the ṛṣis of the former world-period (p. 17). Then the ṛṣis teach them to their pupils; and these again to their pupils and thus by an unbroken succession of teachers and pupils the Vedas are handed down perfectly free from mistakes of any kind (p. 400).

\(^2\) Indra, Agni and other Vedic ‘deities’ (devatās) are not particular individuals; these names rather denote, like the word ‘cow’, particular kinds of bodies. At the beginning of each world-period an individual soul is, as a reward for his good karmas, endowed with the body of Indra. He is then the Indra of that world-
The creation of the various bodies by Hiranyagarbha, or more accurately by B. having Hiranyagarbha for its body, is the act of distinguishing by names and forms' spoken of in Ch. Up. vi. 3. 3. The individual souls, having B. as their Soul, entered the world (i.e. the "cosmic egg") and distinguished it by "names and forms". That is, out of the cosmic egg, different bodies were made, having different names and different shapes, and the individual souls were embodied into them according to the quality of their acts (karman) in their past lives. These bodies were situated in fourteen different worlds (the world of Prajāpati, the world of Indra and so forth; our earth being one of them). They (i.e. embodied souls) are divided into four main classes: celestial beings (devas), animals, human beings, and unmoving beings (p. xiii 642). What kind of embodied souls are understood by the term 'unmoving beings' (sthāvara)? The word sthāvara denotes the vegetable as well as the inorganic world. That the plants are believed to be the bodies, occupied by souls, is without question; as we can see from the frequently occurring expression 'Souls from Brahmā down to grass' (cf. p. x 350); and on p. x 519 among the different kinds of souls he counts trees, bushes, creepers, grasses, and so on. But are stones and the like inhabited by souls? The following considerations make me think that R. does not make an exception of them. In order to denote all kinds of embodied souls R. very often uses the expression 'from Brahmā down to unmoving things' (sthāvara) (cf. p. xiii 642). And as he has nowhere directly or indirectly indicated that the inorganic substances do not

period and discharges the functions of that office. At the end of that period, he looses his body and ceases to be an Indra; next time another individual soul may take his place (p. 13). Thus Indra, Vāyu etc. are all individual souls, who, on account of their past acts of high merit, are given, for a definite period of time, the various important offices which they occupy (p. xii 42). They are sometimes called 'deathless' (amṛta). But this does not mean that they never part with their bodies; it only implies that they live very long (p. 506).

Though Indra and so on are embodied beings, still they can assume any number of bodies at the same time and be present at all the different sacrifices to which they are invited (p. 9).
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

contain souls, I do not see why the word sthāvara should be restricted to plants alone. Besides there are several positive indications, from which it seems that R. believed that the souls are embodied even in inorganic substances. On p. 285 he says that souls are embodied in stones, dry wood etc., as a punishment for their deeds. In Vedārthasaṁgraha (pp. 30—31) he names along with celestial and human beings, dry wood, stones, grass, jars, cloth, and so on as the material things with which the individual souls join themselves. Further according to his interpretation of Ch. Up. vi. 3. 3 the world that we see, with its distinctions of name and form, can come into existence only through the individual souls entering it. This he clearly expresses as follows: — 'All things have their reality and can be denoted by a word, only because the individual souls, having B. for their Soul, have entered them (p. x 215, Ved. Saṁg. p. 28). Hence all individual material things in this world are directly the bodies and therefore the 'modes' of individual souls, and indirectly of B., as B. is the Soul of the individual souls\(^1\) (p. xi 537, Ved. Saṁg. pp. 30 f.).

Chapter II.

Nature of souls.

Souls exist either as conjoined to matter or as free from contact with it. In the former state the nature of the souls suffers from great limitations, which matter puts it under. Hence the nature of the souls will be conveniently treated in two separate sections, the first dealing with the nature of the souls in themselves, and the second with that of the souls implicated in matter.

A. Souls in themselves.

The attribute which belongs to the essence (sārabhūta) of a soul is consciousness (jñāna). On this account it is itself sometimes

\(^1\) See above the foot-note on p. 33.
called (in the Upaniṣads) 'consciousness' (p. 543, Sū. 29). But we must note that the soul is not consciousness itself (jayanamātram), but it is by its nature the subject of consciousness or knower (jñāṭr) (p. 538). In judgments like 'I know' or 'I am happy' that which is expressed by the term 'I' is the soul. It is of psychical nature (ajaḍa) and is to be known as 'I' in immediate self-experience (p. ix 109). The consciousness of 'I' is not a mere quality of the soul, that can pass away; it is the essence of the soul. The loss of the consciousness of 'I' would be the annihilation of the soul ¹ (p. ix 150). But 'consciousness' is an attribute which expresses the essential nature of the soul (svārūpa-nirūpa-dharma), for no soul can exist without consciousness (p. 544). Even in dreamless sleep the soul is not without consciousness. Because though there is then no consciousness of objects, still the sense of 'I' (aham-artha) continues (p. ix 143, p. 545). Along with consciousness R. frequently mentions 'bliss' (ānanda) as constituting the essential nature of souls (cf. p. xi 586). As in the case of B. (see above) this means that in the original natural state of the souls their consciousness is always of the agreeable kind (p. xii 667). In this state their knowledge is of the intuitive nature, i.e. not dependent on the senses (p. xiii 122).

But consciousness is not the only quality of the souls.² The soul is not only a knowing subject, but has also the power to act. Because the scriptures enjoin certain actions and prohibit certain others and attach certain rewards and punishments to them, all which

¹ Hence according to R. the consciousness of 'I' belongs to the essence of the soul and is neither illusion (as the non-dualists would say) nor superimposed by matter (as the Sāṃkhya would say).

² The text which is believed to teach the opposite view is Br. Up. iv. 5. 13. 'Just as a lump of salt has no (distinguishable) inside and outside, but is through and through of the same taste, so the soul has no (distinguishable) inside and outside, but is through and through consciousness.' But R. does not think that this text denies of the soul all other qualities except 'consciousness'. It only says that just as no part of the lump is without salt taste, so no aspect of the soul is without consciousness. But as the lump of salt has colour, hardness and other qualities besides taste, so can the soul too have other qualities (p. 1025).
would have no meaning if the souls were not themselves able to act (p. 555f.). According to the Śaṅkhyā all activity belongs to matter and according to Śaṅkara it belongs to Buddhi (Br. Sū. p. 3. 40). But R. says, 'if the activity belongs to something other than the soul, how could the soul be made to suffer the consequences of acts that are not its own?' But because the soul possesses the power to act, it is not necessary that it must always act; it acts or does not act just as it likes (p. 559, Sū. 39); when the souls are conjoined to bodies, as a retribution for their karman, their actions are influenced by the qualities (sattva, rajas, and tamas) belonging to the material of their bodies¹ (p. 557). But when they are free from contact with matter, they can realize their wishes by their mere will (saṃkalpaśād eva) (p. 1028). Then they are subject to no outward power (p. 1029). But whether as in their natural state the souls possess the power to realize all their wishes, or as in their embodied state they have their power limited by contact with matter, all their activity is dependent on the will of B. (p. 563 & p. 1046).

As said above (p. 42f.) the souls in the state of their pristine purity possess all the auspicious qualities in common with B. (p. 783). The qualities, which according to Ch. Up. viii. 1. 5 express the nature of B. (see above p. 42f.), belong, according to the same Upaniṣad (viii. 7. 1), also to the essential nature of the individual souls (p. xiii 629 bottom, and p. 630). But even in their essential nature the souls differ from B. in two points. Firstly, they have no power whatsoever on the movements in this world, which belongs exclusively to B. (p. 1040). And secondly they are of atomic size,² whereas B. is all-pervading. That the souls are of atomic size (aṇu) we know, because the Scripture teaches that they actually move from place to place (Br. Up. iv. 4. 2 & 6, Kau. Up. i. 2 etc.), which would not be possible if they were all-pervading (Sū. p. 3. 20 & 21, p. 539).

¹ This is, according to R., the meaning of Gītā iii. 27 etc.
² The opposite view is held by the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Śaṅkhyā, Yoga as well as the non-dualistic schools of Vedānta. R. objects to it on the ground that different consciousnesses of different souls cannot be accounted for (p. 546, Sū. 32).
Scriptures moreover distinctly teach that the souls are of atomic size (Mu. Up. iii. 1. 9, Śvet. Up. v. 8 & 9) (p. 546, Sū. 23); when joined to bodies they reside in the heart. But still the consciousness is felt all over the body, because consciousness is related to the soul as light is related to a luminous body, i.e. just as the light extends beyond the place occupied by the luminous body, so does the consciousness extend all over the body, though the soul resides in the heart (p. 542, Sū. 26). But as long as soul is implicated in matter, its consciousness cannot spread itself beyond its body; but when it is free from matter, its consciousness can extend to any number of bodies, which it may like to assume for the time, or to any distance (p. 1036). It is then omniscient, Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2 (p. 1038).

B. Souls conjoined to matter.

We have seen that both B. and souls by nature possess alike all auspicious qualities. But that which distinguishes B. from the souls is, that the former remains eternally free from contact with any evil, whereas the latter can be joined to evils. As a punishment for the sins committed by the souls during their beginningless karman, B. conceals their naturally blessed condition. This concealment is brought about by joining them to 'subtle' matter in the 'dissolution-state' of the world or to material bodies in the 'creation-state' (p. 657).

Originally the souls have all alike the same nature. In themselves they have no distinctions as celestial beings, human beings etc. (p. xiii 643). The distinctions of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc. are due to the connexion with the different kinds of bodies (p. 577, Sū. 47).

1 On this account the souls joined to human bodies are themselves sometimes (e.g. Śvet. Up. v. 8) said to be of the size of a thumb, which is the size of the human heart (p. xiii 638).

2 The comparison between light and consciousness is very common in the works on Vedānta.

3 karman is said to be beginningless, in order to avoid the reasoning in circle, viz. the connexion with bodies depends on karman, whereas karman wants bodies for being performed.
The possession by souls of "name and form" (i.e. a body) brought about by the connexion with matter, as a retribution for their good or bad deeds, is called Samśāra, (cycle of births and deaths)¹ (p. xiii 355). "In the state of Samśāra the essential nature of the soul does not undergo any transmutation as of clay into a pot; only the knowledge and bliss, which belong to the essence of their nature are contracted" (p. xi 586). And as a consequence, while they are in this state moving about in one of the worlds, they suffer evils, whether they are awake, or dreaming, or fast asleep, or in a state of swoon (p. 617). Now they are subject to the influence of karmā and no more free to act as they like (p. 1036). For their knowledge they have to depend on their organs of sense (p. xiii 122).

As explained above the souls that are thus joined to bodies, are divided into four classes: 1) celestial or superhuman beings, which include all kinds of demi-gods as well as demons and ghosts;¹ 2) human beings; 3) animals including beasts, birds, crawling and creeping insects etc.; 4) stationary beings² (sthāvara) (p. x 519).

Of these classes only the human beings, as may be expected, are described in a somewhat detailed way. They possess a gross body, fivefold breath, and eleven organs. The gross body is made of all the five elements, but in it the element, water¹ preponderates (p. 621, Sū. 2). Breath (Prāṇa) is in substance the same as the element, wind¹; but it is, wind¹ existing in a different condition and is not to be considered as, wind¹ itself or as a function of, wind¹ (p. 595, Sū. 8). It is further not to be considered as an element of the material world but as an instrument of the soul, like eye or ear (p. 597). Its function is to support the body and the organs³ (p. 598). The five different motions of breath in the body have five different names,

¹ R. mentions the following as illustrations of this class:— Deva, Asura, Gandharva, Siddha, Vidyādhara, Kinnara, Kimpuruṣa, Yakṣa, Rakṣas, Piśāca.
² For the explanation of this class see above p. 59.
³ For this reason the organs themselves are often called Prāṇas in the Upaniṣads, cf. Br. Up. r. 5. 21 (p. 605).
Prāṇa, Apana, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna; but in reality they are all one breath\(^1\) (p. 598, Sū. 11), cf. Br. Up. i. 5. 3.

The eleven organs are: five organs for doing work, five outer organs of sense, and manas or the inner organ of sense (p. 590, Sū. 5). The functions of the organs of work are seizing (hands) going (feet) etc. The functions of the outer organs of sense are seeing, hearing etc. They give rise to knowledge of their respective objects (colour, sound etc.), when they (the objects) are present and come into contact with the organs. The inner organ (i.e. manas) gives rise to the knowledge of inner states, such as pleasure, pain etc.; it can have no knowledge of the external objects without the help of the outer organs (p. x 409). The function of manas is threefold: decision (adhyavasāya), consciousness of self (abhimāna), and reflection (cintā); and in reference to them it is called Buddhi, Ahamkāra, and Citta respectively; in reality all the three are the same organ, viz. manas, cf. Br. Up. i. 5. 3 (p. 950). All the organs, even manas, are in themselves material, produced by the transmutations of matter (pp. 330 & 586). But they are not made of gross elements. Manas is made of the 'first element' (Bhūtādi) (p. 950); and the rest are made of 'subtle elements' and can exist only if they have 'subtle elements' for their substrate (p. 622).

All the organs as well as breath (Prāṇa) are of atomic size\(^2\) (pp. 593 & 600). Each of them is said to be ruled by some one of the deities (devatās); e.g. the speech by Fire, the eye by the Sun, the breath by Wind, and so on (p. 277). Besides these deities the organs are of course under the power of the souls. But the power of the deities as well as the power of the souls have their origin in the will of B. (p. 602).

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\(^1\) Breath is said to be present in 'stationary' bodies also; but there it does not assume its fivefold form (p. 285).

\(^2\) The reason why the organs and breath are supposed to be of atomic size is, that they are believed, as we shall see later, to accompany the soul, when it leaves the body; but in doing so they are not visible (p. 593).
The states in which the embodied souls exist are either of waking, or of dreaming, or of deep sleep, or of swoon. A few words are necessary to give R.’s views concerning the nature of the last three.

In dream the soul lies in the veins, called Hitā (p. 149). All that it enjoyes or suffers in dream is created by B. (Ka. Up. v. 8, Br. Up. iv. 3. 10); because as long as the soul is not freed from connexion with matter, its power to create the things for its own enjoyment is lost to it¹ (p. 655, Su. 3). These creations exist just for the time and are seen only by the person dreaming and are intended to be the retribution for acts of minor importance (p. 658). We do not see the effects of the experiences in the dream on the body, because a new body, exactly similar to the one lying on the bed, is given for the time to the dreaming person (p. x 150 bottom).

In deep dreamless sleep the soul forsakes name and form²; i.e. is disconnected from the body, organs etc. and becomes united with B. (p. xi 197). In so far deep sleep is similar to final release; but there is this important difference between the two: in final release the auspicious nature of the souls becomes manifest, so that it is all-knowing, full of bliss etc.; but in deep sleep there is no (objective³) knowledge and no joy. Cf. Ch. Up. viii. 11. 2. When it wakes, it leaves B., is conjoined again to its body and organs and begins once more to experience the fruit of its karman (p. 666 f.). Thus, whereas according to Śaṅkara the state of deep sleep is similar to that of final release, R. compares it to the state in which the souls remain during the dissolution-state of the world (p. xiii 618).

According to Ch. Up. viii. 6. 3 the soul, when in deep sleep, lies in the veins near the heart. According to Br. Up. it then lies in the pericardium (puritat). And lastly according to Ch. Up. vi. 8. 1 it becomes united with B. in deep sleep. R. finds no contradiction between these statements, because he thinks that by combining them

¹ Another reason why the experiences in dreams are the creations of B., is that the dreams forebode the good or ill fortune that is to come (p. 658, Su. 6).
² See above p. 60.
all we arrive at the truth. Directly the soul sleeps in B., but B. lies in the pericardium, whereas the pericardium lies on the veins (p. 664).

'Swoon is half way to death. Because at death all breath leaves the body, but in swoon the „subtle“ breath is still connected with the body' (p. 669).

The next point to be considered is the state of the souls after death. Death means separation of the soul from the gross body. If the soul has in its life attained to perfect realisation of the true nature of B. and if its karman is completely destroyed, then after death it attains final release (mokṣa) and has not to be born again, i. e. has no more to assume a material body. Otherwise it must in due time be re-born and experience the fruit of its karman. In the next chapter, which will deal with Final Release, there will be occasion to speak of the condition after death of the souls who have attained to the realisation of B. Hence at this place will be considered the case only of those, who have to be born again.

The souls of the latter kind are roughly divided into two classes: 1) those who have performed sacrifices and other good works (iṣṭāpūrte); and 2) those who have not done what is enjoined, and done what is prohibited, i. e. the sinners (p. 637). We shall first consider the state of the former.

At the time of death, according to Ch. Up. vi. 8. 6, the organ of speech is united with manas (the inner organ) (p. 947). But as we see from Pr. Up. m. 9 all the organs become united with manas, and not the organ of speech alone (p. 948, Sū. 2). Manas, thus united with all the organs, is itself united with breath (Prāṇa) Ch. Up. vi. 8. 6 (p. 949). Then breath is united with the departing soul Br. Up. iv. 4. 2 (p. 952). The soul thus united with breath, manas and organs, is joined to all the subtle (p. 967) elements, as suggested in Ch. Up. vi. 8. 6 and Br. Up. iv. 4. 5 (p. 952 f.). These „subtle elements“ form the substrate for the organs which accompany the soul (p. 622) and cause the formation of the gross body when the soul is re-born (p. 621). The subtle elements, organs, manas
and breath form the 'subtle body', together with which the soul leaves the gross body at death.

The proceeding so far is common to both those who have realised the nature of B. and to those who have not. But hence their ways part (p. 955). The souls of the former class leave the body by the hundred and first vein¹ leading from the heart to the head and then proceed on the 'path of the celestial beings' (devayāna), which will be described in the next chapter. The souls of the latter class, on the other hand, leave the body by some other vein Ch. Up. viii. 6. 6 (p. 956); and if they have performed sacrifices and other pious works, they ascend to the moon by the path of the fore-fathers (pitryāna). This path passes through the following places:— smoke, the region of night, that of the fortnight in which the moon wanes, that of the six months in which the sun goes to the south, the world of the fore-fathers and sky and then it reaches the moon Ch. Up. v. 10. 3—4 (p. 634). When the souls arrive at the moon, they enjoy themselves in the company of the celestial beings as long as their karman entitles them (p. 626). But when they have finished enjoying the fruit of their karman, they return again to the earth Ch. Up. v. 10. 5 (p. 631); because they could not be retributed for all their karman in the moon. A remainder is still left unretributed (anusaya), and to suffer its consequence they must be born again on the earth. If this remainder be of a good kind, they are born in one of the three higher castes; but if it be evil, they have to be born in the lowest caste (cāṇḍāla) or as some wretched animal like a dog or a pig Ch. Up. v. 10. 7 (p. 633).

Their return-journey from the moon to the earth is described in Ch. Up. v. 10. 5—6 as follows:— 'They return by the same way as they came to the sky, from the sky to the wind; having become wind it (the returning soul) becomes smoke; having become smoke, it becomes mist; having become mist, it becomes a cloud; having become a cloud it rains down. Then they (i. e. the returning souls) are born as rice, or barley or herbs or trees or sesamum or beans.

¹ Called suṣumṇā.
From here it is very difficult to proceed.\(^1\) Then it becomes the person who eats it as food and discharges it as semen.\(^2\) Thereupon they get into the kind of womb (yoni) which their karman deserves. Here they are joined to a body and begin to experience pleasure or pain (p. 652, Sū. 27). Before this, i. e. throughout their return-journey from the moon, they were without bodies and experienced neither pleasure nor pain. And if the text says 'it becomes wind, smoke etc.', it only means that they come in contact with wind, smoke etc. and become similar to them (p. 646). Even the words in the text ,they are born as rice etc.' must not be taken in their literal sense. The souls are only in conjunction (samanasha) with rice etc., as they are in conjunction with the person who eats rice etc. (p. 648).

The sinners\(^3\) do not go after death to the moon (p. 645). They are denoted by ,the third place' in Ch. Up. v. 10. 8. They are re-born at once on the earth (p. 641). But as they do not go to the moon, they must be born without the need of father and mother, because, as explained above, the transmission from the father to the mother\(^4\) is the last stage of the soul’s return-journey from the moon (p. 641). This means that they are born either as vermin, supposed to be born from damp heat (svedaja), or as plants (uddhijja) (p. 642).

Chapter III.

Final Release.

The individual souls are by their nature in possession of unlimited knowledge of agreeable kind and enjoy perfect communion

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\(^1\) This implies that the journey from the sky to rice etc. was easy and quick (p. 647).

\(^2\) Deussen translates this sentence differently and perhaps more correctly. But R. (p. 652) as well as other Indian interpreters understand it in the above manner.

\(^3\) See above p. 66.

\(^4\) Called ,fifth oblation' according to Ch. Up. v. 9. 1.
with the Supreme Spirit. But this their nature is obscured by nescience (avidyā) in the form of beginningless karman. When this nescience is destroyed and when the soul regains its natural state of being in communion with the Supreme Soul, it is said to have attained 'final release' (mokṣa) (p. xii 667).

The only means to attain release (mokṣa) or deathlessness (amṛtatva) is the knowledge of the Supreme Person Svet. Up. iii. 8 (p. 157). But B. cannot be known by ordinary means of knowledge; it can be known only by the help of the Scriptures (p. x 431). The knowledge of B. which leads to deathlessness is given in the (last) part of the Vedas, known by the name of Upaniṣads; a systematic discussion of whose texts forms the subject-matter of the Śāriraka-Mimāṃsā (p. vii 414). But before one begins the study of the Śāriraka-Mimāṃsā, it is necessary that one has studied the Karma- (or Purva-) Mimāṃsā, which discusses the nature of the rites and ceremonies prescribed in the earlier part of the Vedas (p. vii 675). The two Mimāṃsās are not opposed to each other in character. They together form one single work, the differences between the two being just like the differences between the two halves of the first Mimāṃsā or between the various chapters (p. vii 266). The right procedure of the study is as follows:— The student first learns from his teacher to recite the Vedas. But while reciting, he notices that the Vedas mention certain means to serve certain purposes; thereupon he applies himself to the study of the Mimāṃsās in order to ascertain the exact nature of the Vedic passages. Then he comes to see that the fruit of mere works (karman) prescribed in the earlier part of the Vedas is limited and passing; whereas he remembers that the latter part of the Vedas, called the Upaniṣads, which also he had learnt to recite, promises a reward, which is unlimited and eternal, viz. deathless-

1 According to R. nescience (avidyā) is nothing else than the result of karman, and its effect is not to create an illusion (māyā) of a world of distinctions, which in reality does not exist; but it only contracts the soul's power of knowledge, see above p. 63.
ness'; and thereupon he applies himself to the study of the Śāristaka-Mimāṃsā (p. vii 351 f.).

Whereas according to Śaṅkara a thorough knowledge of the Karma-Mimāṃsā is not necessary for gaining the knowledge of the nature of B., R. considers it to be an essential pre-requisite. This difference of view is due to the different conceptions of the two regarding the soul's states of bondage\(^1\) and release. According to Śaṅkara bondage or Saṁsāra has no reality, and to know that it is an illusion is to attain release. According to R. Saṁsāra is a reality, an actual implication into a really existing matter; and therefore release is something that must be actually accomplished. Just like Śaṅkara, R. says ,The cessation of nescience (avidyā) is release, and this cessation takes place only through the knowledge of B.' (p. vii 561). But the two understand these words in totally different ways. Śaṅkara understands by 'nescience' what produces an illusionary appearance of a false world of plurality, and hence the knowledge that B. is the only reality and all distinctions are an illusion puts an end to 'nescience', which is the same as being released. Now as the Karma-part of the Veda proceeds from an entirely opposite point of view,\(^2\) its knowledge is of no use to gain the knowledge of B., which puts an end to nescience (Br. Sū. i. 1. 1). But according to R. nescience means the influence of karman — karman and its influence both having real existence (p. x 308). But as explained above (p. 47), the influence of karman comes into operation only through the will of B. Our karman pleases or displeases the Supreme Person, and its fruit is the result of His favour or disfavour. Hence the knowledge which puts an end to nescience, i.e. which destroys the effects of karman, is that knowledge, which by propitiating the Supreme Person, removes all His displeasure (p. 932). Katha Upaniṣad ii. 23 says that the ātman (i.e. B.) cannot be gained by reflection, meditation or hearing; ,only he gains Him whom the ātman (i.e. B.) chooses'. R. explains this as follows: — ,Only he can be chosen by B., who

\(^1\) i.e. Saṁsāra, see above p. 63.

\(^2\) Because all karman presupposes distinctions.
Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja.

is dearest to B.; and he alone can be dearest to B., to whom B. is dearest ¹ (p. vii 629).

'Hence the knowledge which the Vedānta-texts prescribe (as the means for release) is other than the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences (describing the nature of B.); it is of the nature of meditation or communion (p. vii 567). This we see from the fact that the terms 'knowing' (vid) and 'meditating' (upās) are indiscriminately used in the Upaniṣads with regard to the same object, cf. Ch. Up. iii. 18. 1 & 6, Br. Up. i. 4. 7, Ch. Up. iv. 1. 6 & iv. 2. 2 (p. vii 621). Now 'meditation' (dhyāna) means uninterrupted steady remembrance. For this reason Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2 mentions 'remembrance' (smṛti) as the means for release (p. 622). The parallel passage, Mu. Up. ii. 2. 8, mentions 'seeing' (द्रष्टा drṣṭa) in the place of 'remembrance', which shows that the remembrance which leads to release must be so vivid that it acquires the nature of 'seeing', i. e. of direct visual perception (pratyakṣatā) (pp. vii 626 & 628). Only he can attain to the Supreme Person, who possesses the remembrance (of B.), which has acquired the nature of direct perception, and who has become extremely fond of it (i. e. of remembering B.) because of his most intense love of the object of his remembrance (viz. B.). This kind of steady remembrance is known by the name of Bhakti² (devoted attachment) (p. vii 630). 'Hence knowledge which is the means for attaining B. is meditation, practised day by day, made constantly intenser by repetition, and continued till death' (p. vii 634). Thus the knowledge that leads to final release has two elements: firstly the possession of the right knowledge of the nature of B. as taught in the Upaniṣads; and secondly, being able to realise always the immediate presence of B. (Brahma-sākṣātkāra) by repeated meditations on its nature.

¹ Cf. Gītā vi. 10, "To those who are constantly devoted and worship me with love, I give that knowledge by which they reach me."

² In Ved. Samg. (p. 146) R. defines Bhakti as follows: Bhakti is only a particular kind of 'knowledge', of which one is infinitely fond, and which leads to the extinction of all other interests and desires.
Now what obstructs the origination of this kind of knowledge is karman, not only of evil kind, but also good karman (such as sacrifices etc., done with the object of gaining the reward, cf. p. xiii 174) (p. vii 671). All such karman increases in us the qualities of rajas and tamas, which oppose the quality of pure sattva, which is needed in order that the true knowledge may arise in us (p. vii 672). Hence before we attain the true knowledge of B. it is necessary that all the undesirable karman is destroyed; and this can be done only by performing the prescribed religious duties without desiring a reward for them (p. vii 674), or as R. puts it in another place (p. x 313), with the sole object of propitiating the Supreme Person.

The performance of religious works is necessary not only for the origination of 'knowledge', but even after it is originated.\(^1\) Because sacrifices and similar works, performed day by day, purify the mind and the realisation\(^2\) of B. takes place with ever-increasing vividness (p. 885, Sū. 35). 'As agnihotra (a short sacrifice to be performed daily) and other rites are helpful to the realisation of B., and as this realisation requires to be made always more vivid by practising it daily till death, the religious duties of one's āśrama (stage of life) must be performed every day; otherwise if the duties are left undone, the heart will lose its purity and the realisation of B. will not take place (pp. 939 & 940). 'Hence the knowledge which is the means for the attainment of B., wants the performance of works prescribed by the Vedas (cf. p. 460) for the different stages of life (āśrama) (p. vii 675).

But the nature of the religious works, that must be performed, as also the passing and limited nature of the fruit of mere works, can be learnt only from the Karmamāṃsā, and therefore its study forms an essential prerequisite to the study of the Brahmamāṃsā (p. vii 675).

\(^1\) Śaṅkara holds the contrary view (Br. Sū. iii. 4. 25).

\(^2\) I have translated Vidyā by 'realisation of B.', because as explained above, this is what R. means by it.
The same sacrifices etc. that form the duties of the āśrama, are to be performed also as helpful towards the realisation of B. (p. 885, Śū. 34). But religious works like agnihotra etc. can be performed only by those who belong to the āśrama of an householder (grhastha). Hence only in the case of householders the performance of daily and occasional rites and sacrifices is necessary for the attainment of Vidyā (realisation of B.) (p. 876). But men who have retired from the world (Urdhvaretas) can also attain Vidyā as we see from Ch. Up. v. 10. 1, Br. Up. iv. 4. 22 etc. They of course cannot perform the sacrifices of agnihotra etc. (p. 864). In their case Vidya depends only on the performance of the duties incumbent on their own āśramas (p. 874). Men of all the four āśramas can attempt to attain Vidyā, and the performance of the duties of their respective āśramas is helpful towards it (p. 885, Śū. 36 beginning). And to belong to one of the āśramas is also not absolutely necessary for the attainment of Vidyā. Even those who belong to no āśrama, such as widowers, can attain it by the help of prayers, fasting, charity, worship of some deity, and so forth (p. 886). But to remain outside of an āśrama is allowable only in case of necessity. When possible, one must belong to some āśrama; because the performance of āśrama duties is of greater merit than the good works done outside of an āśrama (p. 887). But those, on the other hand, who have taken the vow of an ascetic life (naiśṭhika, vaikhānasa, parivrājaka), but have fallen from that life, loose their right to the attainment of Vidyā (p. 889); no expiatory ceremony (prāyaścittā) can restore it to them (p. 890). The other class of people who have no right to the attainment of Vidyā are the Śūdras; because they can have no access to the Vedas. They can hear itihāsas and pu-rāṇas, but it can help them only to destroy their sins, but not to attain Vidyā (p. 34 f.).

In addition to performing the religious rites, the householder must strive to gain calmness of mind, self-control, etc. (Br. Up. iv. 4. 23); because only thus composure of mind can be secured, which is necessary for the rise of Vidyā (p. 878). Further he must not, un-
less in case of extreme necessity, eat 'unclean' food. Because as Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2 says, 'Pure food produces pure sattva, and pure sattva produces steady remembrance' (p. 881, Sū. 29).

Then according to Br. Up. iii. 5 there are three conditions which help the rise of Vidyā, viz. 1) learning (pāṇḍītya), 2) being like a child (bālyā), 3) sageness (mauna). Firstly, one must possess learning, i.e. one must have the knowledge of the pure and perfect nature of B. and get it fixed through hearing and thinking and through increasing the quality of sattva in oneself by means of devotion to the Supreme Person (p. 899). Then secondly one must be like a child, which means that one must be free from self-conceit, and not that one has to assume all the ways of a child, such as wilful behaviour, and so on (p. 902 f.). And lastly one must be a sage, i.e. one must be able to practise concentrated meditation on B. (p. 900).

Following the Vākyakāra (i.e. Taṅka) R. mentions seven conditions as helpful to the attainment of Vidyā. They are 1) keeping the body unpolluted by unclean food (viveka), 2) absence of attachment (vimoka), 3) repeated reflection (abhyāsa), 4) performance of religious works (kriyā), 5) good conduct (kalyāṇa), 6) freedom from dejection (anavasāda) and 7) freedom from exultation (anuddhārṣa) (pp. vii 634 f.).

The meditations which one has to practise every day in order to obtain release, are to have for their subject some portion of the Upaniṣads, describing the nature of B. These portions are known by the name of Vidyās. There are a number of such Vidyās in the Upaniṣads, e.g. Sad-vidyā, Bhūma-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā, and so forth (p. 836, Sū. 56). Some of these Vidyās occur in more than one Upaniṣad, e.g. Dahara-vidyā occurs in Ch. Up. vii. 1. 1 f. and Br. Up. iv. 4. 22 f. (p. 799, Sū. 38). In that case the characteristics of B. mentioned in all the versions of the Vidyā, are to be combined (p. 719, Sū. 5). All the Vidyās can destroy the beginningless karman, which hinders the realisation of B., and lead the meditator to the attain-

1 In the translation of these terms, I have followed the explanation of the Vākyakāra.
ment of B., which bestows unsurpassable bliss on him. Hence it is enough if one meditates only on one Vidya, because the reward cannot become greater even if one meditates on more than one Vidya (p. 841). Every meditation must include all the essential qualities of B., such as existence (satya), knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so forth, whether these qualities are mentioned in that particular Vidya or not (p. 739). The qualities which express the essential nature of B. are of two kinds, positive and negative (see above p. 42). Hence every Vidya must include both these classes of qualities (p. 784). But the subordinate qualities of B. need not be included in every Vidya (p. 786). In all the Vidyas the meditator must meditate on B., not as different from himself, but as his Soul, i.e. he must consider B. related to himself in the same way as he is related to his own body (p. 915). In some of the Vidyas B. is represented under some symbol (Pratika); but the only adequate symbol for B. is an individual soul, as freed from all connexion with matter. Hence only those who meditate on B. either directly or under the symbol of an individual soul, disconnected from matter, are led to final release; whereas those who meditate on B. under some other symbol are not (p. 1000). The meditations are to be practised in a sitting posture (p. 925). There is no particular time or place fixed for them. They can be practised at any time and at any place, which are suited for the concentration of mind (p. 927).

As explained above Vidya is by its nature extremely pleasing to the Supreme Person; and consequently when one attains it, not only the effect of his past sins (viz. the displeasure of the Supreme Person) is destroyed, but he does not incur His displeasure for the sins that he might commit after the origination of the Vidya. But this immunity from the consequences of the future sins, is in the case of such sins only as he might commit unintentionally. Because as Ka. Up. II. 24 teaches, one can never attain Vidya, unless one is turned away from evil conduct (p. 932). But it is not only the effect of the sins that opposes the success of the Vidya, but also that of good works (punya), such as sacrifices etc. (performed with a view
to reward) (see above). Hence when one attains Vidyā, the effect of his good works too is destroyed. But as good works help one to practise Vidyā by providing one with the necessary rain, food etc., they are destroyed only at death (p. 936, Sū. iv. 1. 14).

According to Vedānta karman is divided into two portions, 1) prārabdha (what has commenced to operate) and 2) saṃcita (accumulated). Our bodies and surroundings as well as all our present experiences are the consequences of the prārabdha portion of our karman. Besides this portion there is a whole, beginningless mass of our karman, which is called saṃcita. It is karman only of the latter class that is destroyed through the rise of the Vidyā. The prārabdha karman, on the other hand, persists; and only after suffering its full consequences can one attain final release. For the retribution of the prārabdha karman, the present life may be sufficient, or it may be necessary to be born again1 (p. 945).

After the Vidvān (i.e. one who has attained Vidyā) has suffered all the consequences of his prārabdha karman, he dies; and at death he is completely freed from all his saṃcita karman, both good and evil (p. 768). But he does not at once loose his subtle body2 (see above p. 66). Just like the souls of those who have performed good works without attaining Vidyā (see above), the soul of the Vidvān too is, at the time of death, united with organs, breath and subtle elements (p. 967). Then the Vidvān along with his subtle body forsakes the gross body by the hundred and first vein leading from the heart to the head. He is able to find out this vein because of the power of Vidyā, and because he had learnt of it while he was practising me-

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1 Under the class of those who, even after attaining Vidyā, are not released at death, come also those persons, who, like Vasiṣṭha and others, are appointed to some office (adhisthāna). They must wait till the term of their office comes to an end, in order to get released (p. 774).

2 The subtle body, just like the gross one, owes its existence to karman. But it continues to exist even after the destruction of the latter, because the power of Vidyā sustains it, in order that the Vidvān may proceed on the path of the celestial beings (devayāna) and go to the place, where the fruit of Vidyā, viz. final release, can be obtained (p. 772 and cf. p. 957).
ditations, and also because through the favour of B., who stayed along with him in the heart, the top of the heart is lit up (p. 972). After having thus left the body by the hundred and first vein, the Vidvān proceeds by the rays of the sun (p. 973). The rays of the sun are present even at night, as is seen from the heat felt at nights in summer and because the Scriptures tell us that the sun's rays are connected with the veins (in the human bodies) (Ch. Up. viii. 6. 2). Hence even if the Vidvān dies at night, still he can proceed on his path (p. 974).

The path along which the Vidvān proceeds, is known by the name of Devayāna (path of the celestial beings). It is described in the following passages of the Upaniṣads :— Ch. Up. iv. 15. 5—6, viii. 6. 5—6, v. 10. 1—2; Br. Up. vi. 2. 15; v. 10. 1; and Kau. Up. i. 3. All these accounts vary more or less from each other; but R. says they all refer to the same path, the apparent differences between them being due to the fact that either the passages call some of the places on the path by different names, or the details left out in some are supplied by others. Hence in order to get a complete description of the path we must combine all these accounts (p. 982). In this way we learn that the path passes through the following places in order :— rays of the sun (called the world of Fire in Kau. Up.) — region of the day — region of the fortnight in which the moon waxes — region of the half-year in which the sun goes to the north — region of the year — the world of wind (mentioned in Br. Up. v. 10. 1 and called Deva-loka in Br. Up. vi. 2. 15) — sun — moon — lightning — the world of Varuṇa — the world of Indra — the world of Prajāpati — Brahma1 (St. iv. 3. 2—3, pp. 983—989).

The presiding deities (devatās) of each of the places from the 'rays of the sun' to the 'lightning' conduct the Vidvān to the next stage of the path (p. 990). But the 'non-human' (amanava) person, who presides over the 'lightning', conducts him all through the remainder of his journey, and not only to the next stage (p. 991).

1 Brahma-loka. R. says that this compound is to be understood to mean 'world which is B.' i. e. B. itself (p. 998).
Though B. is omnipresent, the Vidvān must go to a definite place in order to completely get rid of 'nescience' (p. 997). Here he is freed from all connection with matter i.e. attains final release.

The state in which the soul finds himself after being released, is the full manifestation of his true nature (Ch. Up. viii. 12. 3). He is neither provided with any new magnificent body (p. 103), nor are the excellent qualities, such as 'freedom from sin etc.', which he now possesses, newly originated in him. These qualities have been his own from eternity; but as long as he was in saṃsāra (the state of being connected with matter), they were obscured (or contracted) by 'nescience' in the form of karman. But when his karman is destroyed and when he attains B., these qualities manifest themselves again in their fullness (pp. 1016—1017).

A released soul not only continues to be a knowing subject (Ch. Up. viii. 12. 5), but he becomes omniscient (Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2) (p. 1035). As such the consciousness of 'I' of course continues in the state of release. If this consciousness were to be lost, it would amount to the annihilation of the soul. In that case there would be nothing desirable in release and none would want to exert oneself in the least to attain it¹ (p. ix. 150 f.).

The released soul can realise all his wishes (satyasamkalpa). This means he is master of himself and is no more subject to injunctions and prohibitions (vidhivisedha) (p. 1029). According to Ch. Up. viii. 12. 3, He (i.e. the released soul) moves about laughing, playing, rejoicing with women or with chariots or relatives; the objects and persons with whom he enjoys himself are produced by him by his mere will (Ch. Up. viii. 2. 1 f.) (p. 1028). Sometimes B. produces these objects for him (p. 1034). He can remain without any body or he can assume one if he likes (p. 1033). He also can assume several bodies at the same time (Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2); and his

¹ The knowledge (saṁjñā), which according to Br. Up. II. 4. 12 is denied to the souls after death, is according to R., that kind of knowledge, which one has in the saṃsāra state and for which one has to depend on matter (i.e. senses) (bhūtānvidhāyitva-prayukta) (p. 546).
power of knowledge being no more contracted by karman, he can extend his consciousness to any number of bodies (p. 1036). But the connexion with bodies not being due to karman (p. 285), it does not bring any evil.

The released souls can also go at will to all the different material worlds (vikāraloka) and freely enjoy all the pleasures in them (Ch. Up. vii. 25. 2) (p. 1043). But the joys they enjoy there are not limited and passing. Because they do not look upon the objects of their enjoyment by themselves, and as such, liable to change (vikāra), but as the manifestations of B.'s glory (p. 1044). When one is still subject to karman and therefore looks upon the world as different from B., the world seems painful or at best of limited pleasure. But when one is freed from karman and can look upon the world as the manifestation of B.'s glory, the same world seems full of bliss (p. xii 468).

Even though the released soul can realise all his wishes, he has no power whatsoever on the movements of the world. The glory of the released soul consists in possessing the ability to realise perfectly the nature of B. (p. 1040). Even in the state of release, when there is a likeness between B. and the soul with regard to the possession of all the auspicious qualities, the soul can exist only as the 'body', i.e. as a 'mode' of B.; and now that his 'nescience' is destroyed, he fully realizes that he is not separate from B. (p. 1019). The possession of the auspicious qualities by the souls as well as their continuing to possess them eternally depends on the will of B. (p. 1046).

The released souls, being completely freed from the bondage of karman and having their power of knowledge no more contracted, find their highest joy in the communion with the infinitely blissful B., who has been the sole object of their love; and consequently they cannot wish for anything else or want to do something that might put them back again into saṃsāra. The Supreme Person too most intensely loves those, who have perfectly realised His nature (jñānī) (Gītā vii. 17—18), and therefore having got them once, He will never wish to send them back. Hence when the souls are once released, they do not again return to saṃsāra (p. 1048).